Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 91a

Is not this obvious!¹  — [The statement] IF THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE [she becomes disqualified] FROM THE EATING OF TITHE was required.²  Does, however, the daughter of a Levite become disqualified by prostitution from the eating of tithe? Surely, it was taught: If the daughter of a Levite was taken into captivity³  or was subjected to an act of prostitution,⁴  she may nevertheless be given tithe and she may eat it!⁵  — R. Shesheth replied: This⁶  is a punitive measure.⁷

IF THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST, [she becomes disqualified] FROM THE EATING OF TERUMAH, even Rabbinical terumah.

NEITHER THE HEIRS OF THE ONE HUSBAND NOR THE HEIRS OF THE OTHER ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT HER KETHUBAH etc. How does the question of kethubah arise here?⁸  R. Papa replied: The kethubah of the male children.⁹  [Is not this also] obvious!¹⁰  — It might have been assumed that the Rabbis had penalized only her, since she had committed the forbidden act, but not her children, hence we were informed [that they also lose the kethubah].

THE BROTHER OF THE ONE AND THE BROTHER OF THE OTHER MUST SUBMIT TO HALIZAH, BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. The brother of the first husband submits to halizah in accordance with the Pentateuchal law,¹¹  and may not contract the levirate marriage in accordance with Rabbinic law;¹²  the brother of the second, however, submits to halizah in accordance with Rabbinical law,¹³  and may not contract the levirate marriage either in accordance with Pentateuchal, or in accordance with Rabbinical law.¹⁴

R. JOSE SAID: HER KETHUBAH [REMAINS A CHARGE] UPON THE ESTATE OF HER FIRST HUSBAND etc. Said R. Huna: The latter agree with the former,¹⁵  but the former do not agree with the latter: R. Simeon agrees with R. Eleazar;¹⁶  since he¹⁷  does not penalize [the woman¹⁸  in the case of] cohabitation which constitutes the main prohibition. how much less [would he do so in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands.which are only monetary matters. R. Eleazar, however, does not agree with R. Simeon; [since it is only in respect of] what the woman finds and what she makes with her hands, which are monetary matters, that he does not penalize her, but in respect of cohabitation which is a religious prohibition he does penalize her. And both of them agree with R. Jose; [since they] do not penalize [the woman in respect of] those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband,¹⁹  how much less [would they do so in respect of] the kethubah the purpose of which is²⁰  [for the woman] to take it and depart.²¹  R. Jose, on the other hand, does not agree with them; [since it is only in respect of] the kethubah [the purpose of which is for the woman] to take it and depart,²¹  that he does not penalize her, but in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband,¹⁹  he does penalize her.

R. Johanan stated: The former agree with the latter, but the latter do not agree with the former: R. Jose agrees with R. Eleazar; since he does not penalize [the woman in respect of] the kethubah which has to be taken from the husband and given to the wife,²²  how much less [would be do so in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands which have to be taken from her and given to him.²³  R. Eleazar, however, does not agree with him; [since it is only in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands which have to be taken from the woman and given to the husband,²³  that he does not penalize her, but in respect of the kethubah which has to be taken from him and given to her,²²  he does penalize her. And both of them agree with R. Simeon; since they do not penalize her in respect of matters which [are applicable] while [her first husband] is alive, how much less [would they do so in respect of] cohabitation which takes place after his death. R. Simeon, however, does not agree with them; [since it is only in respect of] cohabitation which [takes place] after [her husband's] death, that he does not penalize her, but [in respect of] those matters which [are applicable] while [he is] alive, he does penalize her.

IF SHE MARRIED WITHOUT AN AUTHORIZATION etc. Said R. Huna in the name of Rab: This is the accepted law.²⁴  R. Nahman said to him: Why should you indulge in circumlocution!²⁵  If you hold the same view as R. Simeon, say. 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon' for, indeed, your traditional statement runs on the same lines as that of R. Simeon! And should you reply. 'If I were to say "the halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon", it might be assumed to apply even to his first statement',²⁶  then say. 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon in his latter statement'!²⁷  — This is a difficulty.

R. Shesheth said: It occurs to me²⁸  that Rab made this reported statement while he was sleepy and about to doze off.²⁹  [His statement] 'This is the accepted law' implies that³⁰  [the Rabbis] differ;³¹  but what could she do? She was but the victim of circumstances!³²  Furthermore, it was taught: 'None of the women in incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, requires a letter of divorce from the man who married her,³³  except a married woman who married again in accordance with a decision of a Beth din'. Only [where she married again] 'in accordance with a decision of a Beth din'³⁴  does she require a letter of divorce, but where [the marriage took place] in accordance with the evidence of two witnesses she requires no letter of divorce.³⁵  Now, whose view is here represented?³⁶  If it be suggested [that it is the view of] R. Simeon, does she [it may be retorted] require a letter of divorce [even where her marriage took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din? Surely it was taught: R. Simeon stated, 'If the Beth din acted³⁷  on their own judgment³⁴  [the marriage is regarded] as a wilful [act of adultery between] a man and a [married] woman;³⁸  [if, however, they acted],³⁰  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses, [the marriage is regarded] as [intercourse between] a man and a woman that was due to error'.³⁹  In both cases, however,⁴⁰  no letter of divorce is thus⁴¹  required.⁴²  Consequently it must represent the view of the Rabbis!⁴³  The fact is [that it⁴⁴  represents the view of] R. Simeon, and you may interpret it as follows. R. Simeon stated: If the Beth din acted⁴⁵  on their own judgment, [the marriage is regarded] as intentional [intercourse⁴⁶  between] a man and an [unmarried] woman and [the latter]⁴⁷  consequently requires a letter of divorce; [If, however, they acted],⁴⁵  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses [the marriage is regarded] as wanton [intercourse between] a man and an [unmarried] woman⁴⁸  and [the latter consequently] requires no letter of divorce.

R. Ashi replied: The statement⁴⁹  was mainly concerned with the question of the prohibition,⁵⁰  and is to be understood as follows:⁵¹  If the Beth din acted⁵²  on their own judgment, [the marriage is regarded] as a wilful [act of adultery between] a man and a [married] woman, and [the latter is consequently] forbidden to her [first] husband; [if, however, they acted]⁴⁹  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses, [the marriage is regarded] as [intercourse between] a man and a woman that was due to error, and [the latter is consequently] not forbidden to her [first] husband.

1. Having the status of a harlot she is obviously forbidden to marry a priest. Cf. Lev. XXI, 7.
2. As this ruling had to be mentioned the other also was included.
3. Where she is exposed to the dangers of gentiles' outrage.
4. Cohabitation with a slave, for instance, or a halal. Cf. supra 68a.
5. Bek. 47a.
6. The disqualification of the Levite's daughter in our Mishnah.
7. For not instituting the necessary enquiries before she married her second husband.
8. Where the woman herself, as stated earlier in our Mishnah, is not entitled to it.
9. Of the woman. By the insertion of the prescribed clause (v. Keth. 52b), her sons are entitled to receive her kethubah from their father's estate when he dies, even if their mother died first and their father married again and had sons with his second wife. They receive her kethubah in addition to their shares in their father's estate to which the sons of both the first and the second wife are equally entitled. In the case spoken of in our Mishnah, however, the sons of the first wife lose their claim to her kethubah.
10. If their mother herself is not entitled to it, how much less her sons whose claim is entirely derived from hers.
11. Since according to Pentateuchal law he is the brother of the proper husband.
12. As a punitive measure against the woman who did not make sufficient enquiries before contracting her second marriage.
13. Pentateuchally the widow is not subject to him at all, since her marriage with his brother was invalid. Cf. supra p. 617, n. 11.
14. Cf. previous two notes.
15. That in respect of the points they mentioned the woman is regarded as the wife of the first husband.
16. V. our Mishnah.
17. Having stated that, HER COHABITATION … WITH THE BROTHER OF THE FIRST HUSBAND EXEMPTS HER RIVAL.
18. In regard to her relationship to her first husband.
19. Lit., 'when she sits under him', when there is reason to apprehend that she would never be divorced in consequence.
20. Lit., 'stands'.
21. Thus actually beginning the process of separation and final divorce.
22. Lit., 'which from his to hers'.
23. Lit., 'which from hers to his'.
24. Cf. supra 88b.
25. [H] (rt. cnd, in Pael 'to go round about'). 'O thou cunning man, what is the use of thy going round about?' (Jast.).
26. That of cohabitation with the brother of the first husband where her second marriage was contracted on the evidence of one witness only.
27. IF SHE MARRIED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION.
28. Lit., 'I would say'.
29. Lit., 'dozing and lying down'.
30. In the final clause, where the woman married on the evidence of two witnesses.
31. Maintaining that the woman is to be penalized.
32. [H] from rt. [H] 'to be compelled'. What better proof could she have had than the testimony of two qualified witnesses.
33. Lit., 'from him'.
34. I.e., where the evidence as to her first husband's death has been given by one witness only.
35. Since she was but an unfortunate victim of circumstances.
36. Lit., 'who is it'.
37. Permitted the remarriage of a woman whose husband's death has been reported.
38. And the woman becomes thereby forbidden to her first husband if he returns.
39. And the return of the woman to her first husband is consequently permitted.
40. Whether the marriage was on the decision of Beth din or on the evidence of two witnesses.
41. Since the comparison was made with acts of presumption and error while divorce was not mentioned at all.
42. The first Baraitha cited, which required a divorce in a case where the woman married in accordance with a decision of the Beth din, cannot therefore represent the view of R. Simeon.
43. Which proves that they also admit that no divorce is necessary where the marriage was contracted in reliance on two witnesses. Who is it, then, that differs from R. Simeon that it should have been necessary for Rab to declare the halachah to be in agreement with his view?
44. The first Baraitha under discussion. V. p. 620. n. 13.
45. V. supra p. 620, n. 8.
46. For the purpose of betrothal. Cf. Kid. 2a.
47. Since her marriage was legal.
48. Which constitutes no legal union.
49. V. supra note 15.
50. Lit., 'he taught in respect of prohibition'.
51. Lit., 'and thus be said'.
52. V. supra p. 620, n. 8.

Rabina replied: The statement was mainly dealing with the question of sacrifice,¹  and is to be understood as follows.²  If the Beth din acted on their own judgment, [the marriage is regarded] as a wilful [act of adultery between] a man and a [married] woman, and [the latter] does not bring a sacrifice;³  if, however, they acted] in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses, [the marriage is regarded] as [intercourse between] a man and a woman that was due to error and [the latter] has to bring a sacrifice.⁴

If you prefer. however, I might say that the first [Baraitha]⁵  represents [the view of] the Rabbis, and you may explain it as follows: 'Except a married woman'⁶  and one 'who married again in accordance with a decision of a Beth din'.⁷

'Ulla raised an objection: Do we accept the plea⁸  'what could she have done'?⁹  Surely we learned: [If a letter of divorce] was dated¹⁰  according to¹¹  an era that was inappropriate,¹²  according to¹¹  the Median era, or according to¹¹  the Greek era, according to [the era of] the building of the Temple, or the destruction of the Temple, or if he¹³  was in the East and wrote, 'In the West', [or he was] in the West and wrote, 'In the East', she¹⁴  must leave her first and her second husband,¹⁵  and all the disabilities¹⁶  [enumerated,¹⁷  are applicable] to her.¹⁸  But why?¹⁹  Let it be argued. 'What could she have done'!²⁰  — She should have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read.²¹

R. Shimi b. Ashi said, Come and hear: If a levir married his sister-in-law²²  and her rival went and married [another man]²³  and then the former²⁴  was found to be incapable of procreation,²⁵  [the latter]²⁶  must leave the one and the other²⁷  and all the disabilities¹⁶  [mentioned²⁸  apply] to her.²⁹  But why?³⁰  Let it be argued. 'What could she have done'!³¹  — She should have waited.

Said Abaye: Come and hear: If the rivals [of] any of the forbidden relatives concerning whom it has been said³²  that they exempt their rivals went and married, and any such forbidden relatives³³  were found to be incapable of procreation,³⁴  [every rival] must leave the one and the other,³⁵  and all the disabilities³⁶  [mentioned³⁷  apply] to her.³⁸  But why?³⁹  Let it be argued. 'What could she have done'! — She should have waited.

Said Raba. Come and hear: If a scribe wrote a letter of divorce for the husband and a quittance⁴⁰  for the wife, and then made a mistake and handed the letter of divorce to the wife and the quittance to the husband, and they⁴¹  gave them to one another,⁴²  and after a time⁴³  the letter of divorce was discovered⁴⁴  in the possession of the husband and the quittance in the possession of the wife, [the latter]⁴⁵  must leave the one as well as the other,⁴⁶  and all the disabilities³⁶  [mentioned⁴⁷  apply] to her.³⁸  But why?⁴⁸  Let It be argued. 'What could she have done'! — She could have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read.⁴⁹

Said R. Ashi, Come and hear: If he⁵⁰  changed⁵¹  his name or her name, the name of his town or the name of her town, she must depart from the one and from the other,⁵²  and all the disabilities³⁶  [mentioned³⁷  apply] to her.³⁸  But why?⁴⁸  Let it be argued. 'What could she have done'! — She should have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read.⁵³

Said Rabina, Come and hear: If a man married a woman⁵⁴  on [the strength of] a bald⁵⁵  letter of divorce she must depart from the one and from the other,⁵⁶  etc.! — She should have arranged for the letter of divorce to be read.⁵⁷

R. Papa desired to decide a case on [the principle of] 'What could she have done',⁵⁸  Said R. Huna Son of R. Joshua to R. Papa: But surely all those⁵⁹  Baraithoth were taught?⁶⁰  The other answered him: Were they not explained?⁶¹  'Shall we then',⁶²  the former retorted, 'rely on explanations'!⁶³

R. Ashi said: No regard need be paid⁶⁴  to a rumour.⁶⁵  What kind of rumour [is here meant]? If it be suggested [that it means] a rumour after marriage.⁶⁶  Surely [it may be objected] R. Ashi has said this once; for R. Ashi stated:

1. Cf. supra n. 6, mutatis mutandis.
2. So BaH. Cf. supra n. 7. Cur. edd. omit, 'and is … follows'.
3. Since her wilful act was performed in reliance on the ruling of Beth din. V. Hor. 2b.
4. As for any other similar sin committed in error.
5. V. supra note 15.
6. Who married again in accordance with the evidence of two witnesses.
7. On the evidence of one witness. According to this interpretation, a marriage on the evidence of two witnesses is not excluded (as was originally suggested supra 91a) and it also requires a letter of divorce.
8. Lit., 'do we say'.
9. R. Shesheth's objection, supra 91a.
10. Lit., 'he wrote'.
11. Lit., 'for the name'.
12. For the place in which, or the time when the document was written.
13. The scribe (Rashi). It is assumed that the witnesses are from the same place as the scribe. (Cf. Tosaf s.v. [H] a.l.)
14. The woman who married again after receiving such a defective document from her husband.
15. Lit., 'from this and from this'.
16. Lit., 'these ways'.
17. Supra 87b and in the Mishnah cited from Gittin (v. infra n. 13), such as the loss of kethubah etc.
18. Cf. Git., Sonc. ed., p. 282, q. v. notes.
19. Should the woman be penalized.
20. She honestly believed the document to be valid.
21. By an expert who would have detected the irregularities and warned her in good time.
22. The widow of his brother who died without issue.
23. Which she is permitted to do, since the levirate marriage of one widow exempts all her rivals from both halizah and the levirate marriage.
24. Lit., 'this', the widow who married the levir.
25. And consequently unable to exempt her rival (cf. supra 12a).
26. The rival mentioned.
27. Lit., 'from this and from this'. She may neither live with the husband she married nor with the levir.
28. V. supra n. 12.
29. Git. 80a.
30. Cf supra n. 14.
31. She surely could not have anticipated the other's incapability.
32. Supra 2a.
33. Lit., 'these'.
34. Cf. supra p. 622, n. 20.
35. V. supra p. 622, n. 22.
36. Lit., these ways'.
37. Supra 87b and in the Mishnah cited from Gittin (cf. Git. 79b) such as the loss of kethubah etc.
38. Git. 80a.
39. Should the woman he penalized.
40. Which the wife gives to the husband on the receipt of her kethubah.
41. Without examining the documents.
42. Lit., 'this to this and this to this'; both of them believing that the husband gave to his wife the letter of divorce, and that the wife gave to her husband the quittance.
43. When the woman had married another man.
44. Lit., 'goes out'.
45. Since her divorce was invalid, the document having been given to her not by her husband as the law requires but by the scribe.
46. Her second and her first husband.
47. V. supra note 7.
48. Should she be subject to the disabilities.
49. When she would immediately have discovered the scribe's error.
50. The husband.
51. In the letter of divorce which he gave to his wife.
52. Lit., 'from this and from this': from her first, and from her second husband.
53. And the change of name would have been discovered at once.
54. Lit., 'he married her'.
55. [H] i.e., a 'folded document' (cf. B.B. 160a) on one of whose folds a signature is wanting. A valid deed of such a character must bear the signature of a witness on each fold and must he signed by no less than three witnesses. V. Git., Sonc. ed., p. 391.
56. V. supra p. 623, n. 22.
57. And the defect would have been discovered forthwith.
58. It was his intention to allow a woman, whose second marriage was contracted on the evidence of two witnesses who had testified that her first husband was dead, to go back to him when he returned.
59. Above mentioned.
60. And in none was the principle of 'what could she have done' acted upon.
61. Special reasons were given why the principle mentioned was not acted upon. In all other cases, however, it should be taken into consideration.
62. Lit., 'shall we rise'.
63. Despite the explanations, the original objections may still be urged. Cur. edd. insert in parenthesis 'and he desisted'. i.e., R. Papa abandoned his contemplated decision.
64. If a woman was authorized by the Beth din to contract a second marriage.
65. That her first husband was still alive.
66. Of the woman with her second husband.