Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Sotah

Folio 18a

Raba asked: How is it if he wrote two scrolls for two suspects and blotted them in one vessel of water? Do we only require that the writing should be expressly for each case? That we have here; or perhaps it is also necessary to have obliteration expressly for each case! If, furthermore, you conclude that we also require obliteration expressly for each case, how is it if he obliterated them in two vessels and then mixed them? Do we only require that the obliteration should be expressly for each case? That we have here; or perhaps each of the women does not drink the water prepared for her! If, furthermore, you conclude that [this renders the rite invalid because] each of the women does not drink the water prepared for her, how is it if he again divided the water into two parts [after having mixed it]? Is there or is there not a retrospective differentiation?²  — The questions remain unanswered. Raba asked: How is it if he made her drink through a straw or tube? Is that to be regarded as a mode of drinking or not? — The question remains unanswered. R. Ashi asked: How is it if some of the water was spilt or remained over? The question remains unanswered.

R. Zera said in the name of Rab: Why are two oaths mentioned in connection with a suspected woman?³  One [was imposed] before [the writing on] the scroll was blotted out and the other after it was blotted out. Raba demurred: They are both written [in the Scriptural text] before [the inscription on] the scroll was obliterated! But, said Raba, with one oath a curse was connected⁴  and not with the other. What was the formula of the oath with which a curse was connected? — R. Amram said in the name of Rab: 'I make thee swear that thou hast not misconducted thyself, for if thou hast, may [the curses] befall thee.' Raba asked: [In this wording] the curse and the oath are distinct!⁵  But, said Raba, [the formula is], 'I make thee swear that if thou hast misconducted thyself, may [the curses] befall thee'.⁶  R. Ashi asked: [In this wording] there is a curse but no oath! But, said R. Ashi, [The formula is], 'I make thee swear that thou hast not misconducted thyself; and that if thou hast, may [the curses] befall thee'.

MISHNAH. TO WHAT DOES SHE RESPOND 'AMEN, AMEN'? AN 'AMEN' OVER THE CURSE AND AN 'AMEN' OVER THE OATH; AN 'AMEN' WITH RESPECT TO THIS MAN⁷  AND AN 'AMEN' WITH RESPECT TO ANY OTHER MAN;⁸  AN 'AMEN' THAT I DID NOT GO ASTRAY AS A BETROTHED MAIDEN OR MARRIED WOMAN

1. He did not write out the text in full before obliterating it.
2. Bererah v. Glos. Do we regard the water now divided as being differentiated and identical with the original quantities of water?
3. V. Num. V, 19, 21.
4. Verse 21 where the phrase oath of cursing occurs.
5. [The oath here is not connected with the curse, but relates to the wife's fidelity.]
6. [The oath relates only to the wife's conduct and is not connected with the curse.]
7. Who is the cause of the ordeal.
8. With whom she may have associated without her husband's knowledge.

ALL AGREE THAT A MAN CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER IN RESPECT OF THE TIME BEFORE SHE WAS BETROTHED²  OR AFTER SHE IS DIVORCED. IF SHE SECLUDES HERSELF WITH ANOTHER MAN³  AND MISCONDUCTS HERSELF AND SUBSEQUENTLY [HER HUSBAND] TAKES HER BACK, HE CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER [IN RESPECT OF THIS].⁴  THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER IN RESPECT OF ANY ACT OF COHABITATION WHICH DOES NOT RENDER HER PROHIBITED TO HIM.

GEMARA. R. Hamnuna said: [A childless widow] waiting for her brother-in-law's [decision whether he would marry her] who acted immorally is forbidden to her levir.⁵  Whence is this? Since the Mishnah teaches: [A CHILDLESS WIDOW] WAITING FOR MY BROTHER-IN-LAW'S [DECISION WHETHER HE WOULD MARRY ME] OR TAKEN TO HIS HOUSE. This is quite right if you say that she is prohibited [to her brother-in-law] then he can make a stipulation with her;⁶  but if you say that she is not prohibited to him,⁷  how can he make a stipulation with her; for we have learnt: THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER IN RESPECT OF ANY ACT OF COHABITATION WHICH DOES NOT RENDER HER PROHIBITED TO HIM! In the West,⁸  however, they said: The legal decision is not in agreement with R. Hamnuna. But whose [then] is the teaching concerning [A CHILDLESS WIDOW] WAITING FOR HER BROTHER-IN-LAW OR TAKEN TO HIS HOUSE? — It is R. Akiba's; for he said: No betrothal can take effect in cases which are subject to a mere negative prohibition,⁹  and he regards her¹⁰  act as equal to an incestuous union.¹¹

R. Jeremiah asked: Can he make a stipulation in connection with a first marriage¹²  or her marriage with his brother?¹³  — Come and hear: THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER IN RESPECT OF ANY ACT OF COHABITATION WHICH DOES NOT RENDER HER PROHIBITED TO HIM. Consequently when it would render her prohibited to him he can make a stipulation with her. Draw that conclusion.¹⁴

R. MEIR SAYS: ONE 'AMEN' IS THAT I HAVE NOT MISCONDUCTED MYSELF etc. It has been taught: When R. Meir declares, AND THE OTHER 'AMEN' THAT I WILL NOT MISCONDUCT MYSELF, it does not imply that if she in the future misconducts herself, the water affects her now; but should she later misconduct herself, the water will bestir and affect her.

R. Ashi asked: Can a man make a stipulation with regard to remarriage?¹⁵  [Do we argue] that for the present she is not prohibited to him [and therefore he cannot make a stipulation with her], or that it may happen that he will divorce and remarry her [and therefore can make a stipulation]? — Come and hear: ALL AGREE THAT A MAN CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER IN RESPECT OF THE TIME BEFORE SHE WAS BETROTHED OR AFTER SHE IS DIVORCED. IF SHE SECLUDES HERSELF WITH ANOTHER MAN AND MISCONDUCTS HERSELF AND SUBSEQUENTLY [HER HUSBAND] TOOK HER BACK, HE CANNOT MAKE A STIPULATION WITH HER [IN RESPECT OF THIS]. Hence if he takes her back and she then misconducts herself, he can make a stipulation [in respect of this]. Draw that conclusion.¹⁶

Our Rabbis have taught: This is the law of jealousy¹⁷  — it teaches that a woman may drink [the water of bitterness] and do so again.¹⁸  R. Judah says: 'This'¹⁹  indicates that a woman does not drink and do so again. R. Judah said: It happened that Nehonia the welldigger²⁰  testified before us that a woman had drunk [the water of bitterness] and had done so a second time. We accepted his testimony as relating to two husbands but not one husband. The Sages, however, declared that a woman does not drink and do so again, whether it be in respect of one husband or two husbands. But for the first Tanna [cited above] it is likewise written 'This'!²¹  And for the latter Rabbis [cited above] it is likewise written 'the law of!²²  — Raba said: In the case of the same husband and the same paramour none differ that a woman does not drink and do so again,

1. For the purpose of marriage, but before its consummation.
2. That she had never acted immorally.
3. After being divorced, and the divorce was not on account of misconduct because in that event there could be no re-marriage.
4. In respect of what she may have done after the divorce.
5. Because she is regarded as a wife who was unfaithful to her husband.
6. In respect of her conduct before he married her; and if she was immoral, he may not marry her.
7. For immorality before marriage.
8. The Palestinian Schools.
9. Without carrying with them the death penalty or of kareth. There is such a prohibition in connection with a childless widow's marriage (v. Deut. XXV, 5) v. Yeb. 10b.
10. The childless widow who acted immorally.
11. [And therefore forbidden to her brother-in-law just as a wife who misconducted herself is forbidden to her husband.]
12. When he had remarried her after divorcing her can he make her swear that she had been faithful to him during their first marriage?
13. After he had gone through the levirate-marriage with her, can he make her swear that she had not misconducted herself whilst living with his brother?
14. In both of the contingencies mentioned immorality would render her prohibited; so he can make the stipulation.
15. Since R. Meir interprets 'Amen' as referring to what may occur in the future, suppose a husband makes a condition that his wife shall not misconduct herself if he divorces her and remarries her, and after remarriage she is unfaithful?
16. That such a stipulation is permissible.
17. Num. V, 29. The text is literally 'law of jealousies', which is taken to mean: the law is to be applied in every instance of suspicion.
18. If suspected a second time.
19. The word has an exclusive meaning, and equals this is the only time the woman undergoes the ordeal.
20. [V. B.K. (Sonc. ed.) p. 287. He however could not have testified before R. Judah who lived about 200 years later. The text must accordingly be connected with the parallel passage in J. Sotah II, where the reading is Nehemia of Shihin testified in the name of R. Akiba v. Hyman, A Toledoth, p. 924.]
21. He permits a woman to drink a second time; why does he not interpret 'This' is an exclusive sense?
22. Why do they not understand this as not permitting the second ordeal?