Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath

Folio 92a

which he can rip open¹  if he desires and extract [the coins]? — The reference is to a bar of metal.²  But since it has straps,³  he [the thief] can take it out up to its opening, untie [the straps] and take out the bar,⁴  whilst the straps [still] unite it to within?⁵  — It refers to one that has no straps. Alternatively, it has straps, but they are wound round about it [the purse].⁶  And Raba said likewise: They learnt this only of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, but if it is full of mustard he is culpable. This proves that he holds that the tie of a vessel is not regarded as a tie. Abaye ruled: Even if it is full of mustard he is not culpable, [which] proves that he holds that the tie of a vessel is regarded as a tie. Abaye [subsequently] adopted Raba's view, while Raba adopted Abaye's view. Now Abaye is self-contradictory, and Raba likewise. For it was taught: If one carries out produce into the street, — Abaye said: If in his hand, he is culpable;⁷  if in a vessel, he is not culpable.⁸  But Raba ruled: If in his hand, he is not culpable;⁹  if in a vessel, he is culpable?¹⁰ — Reverse it. 'If in his hand, he is culpable'? But we learnt: If the master stretches his hand without and the poor man takes [an object] from it, or places [an article] therein and he carries it inside, both are exempt? — There it is above three [handbreadths],¹¹  but here it is below three.¹²

MISHNAH. IF ONE CARRIES OUT [AN ARTICLE], WHETHER WITH HIS RIGHT OR WITH HIS LEFT [HAND], IN HIS LAP OR ON HIS SHOULDER, HE IS CULPABLE, BECAUSE THUS WAS THE CARRYING OF THE CHILDREN OF KOHATH.¹³  IN A BACKHANDED MANNER,¹⁴  [E.G.,] WITH HIS FOOT, IN HIS MOUTH, WITH HIS ELBOW, IN HIS EAR, IN HIS HAIR, IN HIS BELT WITH ITS OPENING DOWNWARDS,¹⁵  BETWEEN HIS BELT AND HIS SHIRT, IN THE HEM OF HIS SHIRT, IN HIS SHOES OR SANDALS, HE IS NOT CULPABLE, BECAUSE HE HAS NOT CARRIED [IT] OUT AS PEOPLE [GENERALLY] CARRY OUT.

GEMARA. R. Eleazar said: If one carries out a burden above ten handbreadths [from the street level], he is culpable,¹⁶  for thus was the carrying of the children of Kohath. And how do we know that the carrying of the children of Kohath [was thus]? Because it is written, by the tabernacle, and by the altar round about:¹⁷  the altar is likened to the Tabernacle: just as the Tabernacle was ten cubits [high], so was the altar ten cubits high. And how do we know this of the Tabernacle itself? — Because it is written, Ten cubits shall be the length of a board,¹⁸  and it is [also] said, and he spread the tent over the Tabernacle,¹⁹  whereon Rab commented: Moses our Teacher spread it. Hence you may learn that the Levites were ten cubits tall.²⁰  Now it is well known that any burden that is carried on staves, a third is above [the porter's height] and two thirds are below: thus it is found that it was very much raised.²¹  Alternatively, [it is deduced] from the Ark. For a Master said: The Ark was nine [handbreadths high], and the mercy-seat was one handbreadth; hence we have ten. And it is well known that any burden that is carried on staves, a third is above and two thirds are below: thus it is found that it was very much raised.²²  But deduce it from Moses? — Perhaps Moses was different, because a Master said: The Shechinah rests only on a wise man, a strong man, a wealthy man and a tall man.'²³

Rab said on R. Hiyya's authority: If one carries out a burden on his head²⁴  on the Sabbath, he is liable to a sin-offering. because the people of Huzal²⁵  do thus. Are then the people of Huzal the world's majority!²⁶  Rather if stated, it was thus stated: Rab said on R. Hiyya's authority: if a Huzalite carries out a burden on his head on the Sabbath, he is liable to a sin-offering, because his fellow-citizens do thus. But let his practice²⁷  be null by comparison with that of all men?²⁸  Rather if stated, it was thus stated: If one carries out a burden on his head, he is not culpable.

1. [The seams of their purses were loosely sewn (Tosaf.)].
2. And as long as part of it is within he has committed no theft.
3. To close it.
4. Whereby he has already committed the theft.
5. In respect of the Sabbath; hence he has not yet desecrated the Sabbath.
6. So that when he takes it out as far as its opening, the whole bag and straps are outside too.
7. Even if his body is in the house, because the tie of his body is not a tie in this respect.
8. If part of the utensil is within, as R. Johanan supra 91b; this contradicts Abaye's subsequent view.
9. The tie of the body is a tie.
10. [It was known to the retractors of the Talmud that this controversy took place after Abaye and Raba had retracted (Tosaf.)];
11. And the exemption is because the same person did not effect both the removal and the depositing, not because of the tie of the body.
12. So that it is technically at rest; Cf. p. 12, n. 6.
13. In connection with the Tabernacle in the wilderness, v. Num. VII, 9. The definition of forbidden labour on the Sabbath which involves culpability is learnt from the Tabernacle; v. supra 49b.
14. This is the idiom for anything done in an unusual way.
15. Of course, if the opening is on top such carrying would be quite usual.
16. Though the space there ranks as a place of non-culpability v. supra 6a.
17. Num. III, 26.
18. Ex. XXVI, 16.
19. Ibid. XL, 19.
20. It is now assumed that all Levites were as tall as Moses.
21. The Kohathites carried the altar on staves on their shoulders. Allowing for two thirds of the altar to swing below the top of their heads, the bottom of the altar would still be a third of ten cubits-i.e., three and one third cubits-from the ground, which is considerably more than ten handbreadths.
22. For allowing for Levites of the usual height, viz., three cubits eighteen handbreadths, and two thirds of the Ark, i.e., six and two thirds handbreadths swinging below the level of their heads, its bottom would still be eleven and one third handbreadths above the ground. — This alternative rejects the deduction from Moses.
23. Hence Moses' height may have been exceptional. V. Ned., Sonc. ed., p. 119 n. 4; also Gorfinkle, 'The Eight chapters of Maimonides', p. 80, for an interesting though fanciful explanation of this passage.
24. Not holding it with his hands at all.
25. V. Sanh., p. 98, n. 3.
26. To set the standard for all others
27. Lit., 'mind'.
28. For since most people do not carry it thus, it is an unusual form of carriage

And should you object, But the people of Huzal do thus, their practice is null by comparison with that of all men.

MISHNAH. IF ONE INTENDS TO CARRY OUT [AN OBJECT] IN FRONT OF HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND¹  BEHIND HIM, HE IS NOT CULPABLE; BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, HE IS CULPABLE. [YET] IN TRUTH IT WAS SAID: A WOMAN, WHO WRAPS HERSELF ROUND WITH AN APRON WHETHER [THE ARTICLE IS CARRIED] BEFORE OR BEHIND HER,²  IS CULPABLE, BECAUSE IT IS NATURAL³  FOR IT TO REVERSE ITSELF.⁴  R. JUDAH SAID: ALSO THOSE WHO RECEIVE NOTES.⁵

GEMARA. What is the difference in [intending to carry it] BEFORE HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEHIND HIM, that HE IS NOT CULPABLE? [Presumably] because his intention was not fulfilled! But then [if he intended to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, [there] too his intention was not fulfilled! Said R. Eleazar: There is a contradiction:⁶  he who learnt the one did not learn the other. Raba said: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps [where he intended to carry it] BEFORE HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEHIND HIM, this is the reason that HE IS NOT CULPABLE, because he intended a strong vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it only] a weak vigilance;⁷  but [if he intended to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKED ROUND BEFORE HIM, this is the reason that HE IS CULPABLE, because he intended [only] a weak vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it] a strong vigilance.⁸  But then what is R. Eleazar's difficulty? The implications of the Mishnah are a difficulty:⁹  IF ONE INTENDS TO CARRY OUT [AN OBJECT] IN FRONT OF HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, HE IS NOT CULPABLE: hence [if he intends to carry it] behind him and it comes behind him, he is culpable. Then consider the second clause: BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, only then is he CULPABLE: hence [if he intends to carry it] behind him and it comes behind him, he is not culpable?¹⁰  — Said R. Eleazar: There is a contradiction: he who learnt the one did not learn the other. R. Ashi observed: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps he leads to a climax:¹¹  it is unnecessary [to rule that if he intended to carry it] behind him and it came behind him, he is culpable, since his intention was fulfilled. But even [if he intends to carry it] BEHIND HIM, BUT IT WORKS ROUND BEFORE HIM, it must be [stated]. [For] you might think that I will rule, since his intention was unfulfilled, he is not culpable; therefore he informs us that he intended [only] a weak vigilance whereas he succeeded [in giving it] a strong vigilance, So that he is culpable.

[Shall we say that where he intends to carry it] behind him, and it comes behind him, there is a controversy of Tannaim? For it was taught: If one intends carrying out [an object] in his belt with its opening above, but he carries [it] out in, his belt with its opening below, [or] if one intends to carry out in his belt with its opening below,¹² — R. Judah rules that he is culpable, but the Sages hold him not culpable. Said R. Judah to them: Do you not admit that [if one intends to carry out an object] behind him and it comes behind him, he is culpable?¹³  Whilst they said to him: Do you not admit that [if one carries out an object] as with the back of his hand or with his foot, he is not culpable? Said R. Judah: I stated one argument, and they stated one argument. I found no answer to their argument, and they found no answer to mine. Now, since he says to them, 'Do you not admit,' does it not surely follow that the Rabbis hold that he is not culpable?¹⁴  Then on your reasoning, when they say to him, 'Do you not admit,' does it follow that R. Judah holds him, culpable! But surely it was taught: With the back of his hand or his foot, all agree that he is not culpable! Rather [conclude thus: if one intends to carry out an object] behind him and it comes behind him, all agree that he is culpable; with the back of his hand or foot, all agree that he is not culpable. They differ when [he carries it out] in his belt with its opening below: one Master likens it to [intending to carry it out] behind him and it comes behind him, while the other Master likens it [to carrying] with the back of one's hand or foot.

IN TRUTH IT WAS SAID: A WOMAN, etc. It was taught: Every [statement of] 'In truth [etc.]' is the halachah.¹⁵

R. JUDAH SAID: ALSO THOSE WHO RECEIVE NOTES. A Tanna taught: Because clerks of the State do thus.¹⁶

MISHNAH. IF ONE CARRIES OUT A LOAF INTO THE STREET, HE IS CULPABLE; IF TWO CARRY IT OUT, THEY ARE NOT CULPABLE. IF ONE COULD NOT CARRY IT OUT AND TWO CARRY IT OUT, THEY ARE CULPABLE; BUT R. SIMEON EXEMPTS [THEM].¹⁷

GEMARA. Rab Judah said in Rab's name-others state, Abaye said — others again state, it was taught in a Baraitha: If each alone is able,¹⁸ — R. Meir holds [them] culpable, while R. Judah and R. Simeon hold [them] not culpable. If each alone is unable, R. Judah and R. Meir hold [them] culpable, while R. Simeon exempts [them]. If one is able but the other is not, all agree that he is culpable.¹⁹  It was taught likewise: if one carries out a loaf into the street, he is culpable. If two carry it out: R. Meir declares him culpable; R. Judah rules: If one could not carry it out and both carry it out, they are culpable, otherwise they are not culpable; while R. Simeon exempts [them].

Whence do we know this? — For our Rabbis taught: [And if any one … sin…] in his doing [etc.]:²⁰  [only] he who does the whole of it [is culpable], but not he who does part of it. How so? If two hold a pitchfork and sweep [corn together];²¹  [or] the shuttle, and press;²²  or a quill. and write; or a cane, and carry it out into the street,²³ — I might think that they are culpable: hence it is stated, 'in his doing': [only] he who does the whole of it, but not he who does part of it.

1. Lit., 'it comes'.
2. I.e., if she hangs anything on it to carry it out, either before or behind her, but it becomes reversed.
3. Lit., 'fit'.
4. Hence she knows of this, and such must be considered her intention.
5. Tosaf.: officials who go out with documents for taking a census, inventories of the State treasury, etc. They carried these in pouches hanging from their belts, which sometimes turned round back to front. R. Judah rules that these too are culpable in such a case.
6. Jast. R. Han: (I take) an oath! (quoted in Tosaf. Keth. 75b s.v. [H]).
7. Hence his intention is unfulfilled.
8. Hence his intention was more than fulfilled.
9. [MS.M.: Rather if there is a difficulty the following is the difficulty.]
10. Presumably because such carriage is unnatural, as one cannot exercise a proper vigilance.
11. Lit., 'he states', 'it is unnecessary'.
12. This is the reading in the Tosef. Shab. and is thus emended here by Wilna Gaon. Cur. edd.: If one carries out money in his belt with its opening above he is culpable; if its opening is below, R. Judah rules that he is culpable etc.
13. So here too, though carrying an object in a belt with its opening below is unusual.
14. Thus it is dependent on Tannaim.
15. V. B.M. 60a.
16. 'Aruk: they carry their documents in an apron around their loins, and sometimes these are at the front and sometimes at the back.
17. From a sin-offering.
18. To carry it out alone.
19. This is discussed infra.
20. Lev. lv, 27.
21. Which is forbidden on the ground of binding sheaves, supra 73a.
22. Which is weaving.
23. All these actions can be done by one man.