Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Sanhedrin

Folio 24a

The above text reads: 'Resh Lakish said: "Imagine a holy mouth [sc. R. Meir] uttering such a thing!" Read therefore [in the Mishnah], "The witness" [singular].' Surely this is not so! For 'Ulla said: One who saw Resh Lakish in the Beth-Hamidrash [engaged in debate] would think that he was uprooting mountains and grinding them against each other!⁶  — Rabina said: But did not he who saw R. Meir in the Beth-Hamidrash feel that he was uprooting yet greater mountains and grinding them against each other?⁷  — He means this:⁸  Come and see how they [the Palestinians] esteem one another!⁹ Another instance; Rabbi sat and said: It is forbidden to store away the cold [water].¹⁰  But R. Ishmael son of R. Jose remarked in his presence; My father permitted it. Then the Zaken¹¹  has already decided the matter,¹²  replied Rabbi. [Thereupon] R. Papa said: Come and see how much they respected each other, for were R. Jose alive, he would have sat submissively before Rabbi, for as we have seen, R. Ishmael son of R. Jose, who was a worthy successor of his forefathers,¹³  sat submissively before him,¹⁴  yet he [Rabbi] said of him, 'The Zaken has already decided.'

R. Oshaia said: What is the meaning of the verse, And I took unto me the two staves; the one I called No'am [graciousness] and the other I called 'hoblim'¹⁵  [binders]?¹⁶  — 'No'am' refers to the scholars of Palestine, who treat each other graciously [man'imim] when engaged in halachic debates; 'hoblim', to the scholars of Babylon, who injure each other's feelings [mehablim] when discussing halachah.¹⁷

[It is written]: Then said he, These are the two anointed ones etc.¹⁸  [This is preceded by:] And two olive trees by it.¹⁹  R. Isaac said: 'yizhar' designates the scholars of Palestine, who are affable to each other when engaged in halachic debates, like olive oil [which is soothing]; [whilst] and two olive trees stand by it, symbolise the scholars of Babylon, who are as bitter to each other in halachic discussions as olive trees.²⁰

Then lifted I up mine eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women and the wind was in their wings; for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then said I to the angel that spoke with me, 'Whither do these bear the measure?' And he said unto me, 'To build her a house in the land of Shinar.'²¹  R. Johanan said on the authority of R. Simeon b. Johai: These [the 'two women'] symbolise hypocrisy and arrogance, which made their home²²  in Babylon. But was Babylon really the home of haughtiness; did not the master say, Ten kabs²³  of arrogance came down into the world, of which Elam²⁴  took nine and the rest of the world one? — Yes, originally it descended to Babylon, but it travelled to Elam. This can also be inferred from the phrase, to build her²⁵  a house in the land of Shinar. This proves it.

But a Master said that the symptom of pride is poverty, and did not poverty descend upon Babylon? — By 'poverty',²⁶  the dearth of learning²⁷  is meant, for it is written, We have a little sister and she has no breasts;²⁸  whereon R. Johanan observed: This is a symbol of Elam, which was privileged to study, but not to teach.²⁹

What does [the name] Babel connote?³⁰  — R. Johanan answered: [That the study of] Scripture, Mishnah and Talmud was intermingled [therein].³¹

He hath made me to dwell in dark places like those that have been long dead.³²  This, said R. Jeremiah, refers to the Babylonian Talmud.³³

MISHNAH. IF ONE [OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES] SAYS TO THE OTHER: I ACCEPT MY FATHER OR THY FATHER AS TRUSTWORTHY,³⁴  OR, I HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THREE COWHERDS,³⁵  R. MEIR SAYS, HE MAY [SUBSEQUENTLY] RETRACT; BUT THE SAGES RULE, HE CANNOT. IF A MAN WAS UNDER THE OBLIGATION OF AN OATH TO HIS NEIGHBOUR, AND THE LATTER SAID TO HIM 'VOW TO ME BY THE LIFE OF THY HEAD,'³⁶  R. MEIR HOLDS, HE MAY RETRACT; BUT THE SAGES MAINTAIN, HE CANNOT.³⁷

GEMARA. R. Dimi the son of R. Nahman the son of R. Joseph said: [The Mishnah refers to a case] e.g., where he [the litigant] accepted him [sc. one of those mentioned] as one [of the three judges required].³⁸

Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: The controversy [of R. Meir and the Rabbis³⁹  over a case] is only [where the plaintiff says]: 'My claim against thee be remitted' [if the judges so decide]; but [if the defendant says], 'I will pay thy claim' [should it be so decided], all [even the Rabbis] agree that he may retract.⁴⁰  R. Johanan said: They differ over the latter case.

The scholars propounded [the following problem]: [Does R. Johanan mean that] they differ only over the latter case, but that in the former, all [even R. Meir] agree that he cannot retract; or does he hold that they differ with respect to both cases? — Come and hear! For Raba said: They differ [only] in respect of, 'I will pay thee;' but in the case of, 'It be remitted to thee,' all [even R. Meir] agree that he cannot retract. Now, if you say [that R. Johanan maintains], Their difference is only in the case of, 'I will pay thee'; but in the case of, 'It be remitted to thee,' all agree that he cannot retract, it is correct: then Raba's opinion coincides with that of R. Johanan. But should you say, their dispute applies to both, with whom does Raba agree?⁴¹  — Raba [on the latter hypotheses] states an independent view.⁴²

R. Aha b. Tahlifa objected to Raba's view: IF ONE WAS UNDER THE OBLIGATION OF AN OATH TO HIS NEIGHBOUR, AND THE LATTER SAID TO HIM, 'VOW TO ME BY THE LIFE OF THY HEAD;' R. MEIR HOLDS HE MAY RETRACT; BUT THE SAGES MAINTAIN, HE CANNOT.

1. [H], Miggo. A Talmudical rule by which an action is declared valid because part of it is indisputably legitimate. In this case, the rule is accepted by R. Meir but not by the Rabbis.
2. I.e., the litigant proved his opponent's witnesses invalid, but was unable to do so likewise in the case of the proposed judges. Yet in virtue of the first, he can object to his opponent's choice of judges too.
3. Who said above that where there is only one set of witnesses available, all agree that they cannot be rejected.
4. V. p. 135, n. 7.
5. The dispute is whether this reasoning is acceptable in general, though in the actual case under discussion there may possibly be no difference. Thus, Rabin holds that miggo is generally accepted, and here too, whilst R. Dimi rejects this reasoning here and elsewhere; therefore, it is only because R. Meir maintains that a litigant must substantiate his whole statement that his opponent is able to disqualify his witnesses, as explained above, and this is irrespective of whether the judges have been proved incompetent or not.
6. So ingenious a mind did he have. How then could he be so modest as to refer to R. Meir as 'a holy mouth', thus implying that the latter's learning and skill was far above his own? — 'Mountain' is used figuratively for the problems overcome by dialectical ingenuity.
7. Hence, notwithstanding Resh Lakish's dialectic skill, R. Meir was his superior.
8. This is an answer to Rabina's observation. In fact, the previous remark was not an objection, but a comment.
9. Able as he was, Resh Lakish did appreciate R. Meir, as the above quotation shows.
10. In cool sand, to preserve its coolness for the Sabbath, though the measure in general is directed against the storing of food in such a way that it grows warmer. Cf. Shab. 51a.
11. R. Jose; Zaken, lit., 'elder' = scholar, sage.
12. I.e., the law must remain as he has ruled.
13. I.e., he took his father's place.
14. As a disciple.
15. Also 'injuries'.
16. Zech. XI, 7
17. Discussions were carried on far more energetically in the Babylonian academies than in the Palestinian, and in fact, there is considerably more controversy in the Babylonian than in the Jerusalem Talmud.
18. Lit., 'The sons of 'yizhar' (clear oil).' Ibid. IV, 14.
19. Ibid. 3.
20. The wood of which is bitter to the taste.
21. Zech. V, 9-11.
22. Lit., 'descended into'.
23. A measure.
24. The country named after the eldest son of Shem. (Gen. X, 22.) It lay along Shushan and the river Ulai. Cf. Dan. VIII, 2, and had Babylonia on the West.
25. Only one of the vices, thus proving that the other did not settle there permanently.
26. As a symptom of pride.
27. Lit., 'the Torah'.
28. Cant. VIII, 8.
29. I.e., its learning had remained stagnant. [On the all-pervading ignorance of the Law among the Jews of Elam (Hozea, Khuzistan), v. Pes. 50b-51a.]
30. [H]; Babylonia. Based on the popular etymology of the word from [H] 'to mix', 'confound', cf. Gen. XI, 9.
31. This may either mean that all three were studied; or preferably, as explained by R. Tam a.l., that the Babylonian Talmud itself is a compound of all three.
32. Lam. III, 6.
33. Which is profound and dark to the unversed. Cf. Hag. 10a. The word 'Talmud' refers to both the mode of study and the actual content of that study, and either or both may be referred to here.
34. A father is disqualified to act as judge: v. infra 27b.
35. Considered to be the lowest class in society.
36. Such is not the formula of a judicial oath, which is sworn in the name of God. Here both the swearing, i.e., 'I swear', and the Divine name are absent.
37. And demand a proper oath.
38. Though there are two others eligible, R. Meir still holds that he may retract (Rashi). Tosaf. explains more plausibly: Only then do the Sages rule that he cannot retract. If, however, he had accepted one of these as the equivalent of a complete court, even the Sages admit that he can subsequently retract. V. supra p. 132, n. 11.
39. The Sages.
40. Less authority is required to rule that one retains what is already in his possession, since possession itself affords a presumption of ownership, than to transfer money from one to another. Hence, only in the former case do the Rabbis rule that an undertaking to abide by the decision of an unqualified judge is binding, but not in the latter.
41. For it coincides neither with that of Samuel nor with that of R. Johanan.
42. I.e., he is not bound to agree either with Samuel or R. Johanan. Hence the question remains unanswered.

Sanhedrin 24b

But if so, has this not already been taught in the first clause [of the Mishnah]?⁴  — It [the Mishnah] teaches the case where he [sc. the defendant] makes the irregular procedure depend on the judgment of others,⁵  and also where he makes it depend on his [sc. the plaintiff's] action. And both are necessary. For had it taught only the case where he [the defendant] makes it depend on the judgment of others, [we might have assumed that] in this case alone does R. Meir hold that he can retract since he might not definitely have decided to abide by their decision, but [inwardly] argued, 'Who can say that they will give judgment in the other's favour?' Whereas, if he makes it depend on his [sc. the plaintiff's] action, I might think that he [R. Meir] agrees with the Rabbis [that he cannot retract].⁶  Again, had he [the Tanna] stated the latter case alone, we might have assumed, only there do the Rabbis rule thus; but in the former case, we might think⁷  that they agree with R. Meir. Hence both are necessary.

Resh Lakish said: The dispute [between R. Meir and the Rabbis] is [over a case where the litigant retracts] before the rendering of the legal decision:⁸  but once the decision has been given, all [even R. Meir] agree that he cannot retract. While R. Johanan said: They differ [where one retracts] after the decision is rendered.

The scholars propounded [the following problem:] [Does this mean that] the dispute is [only where the litigant retracts] after the promulgation of the decision; but before, all [even the Rabbis] agree that he can retract; or do they differ in both instances? — Come and hear! For Raba said: If one accepted a kinsman or a man [otherwise] ineligible [as judge or witness], he may retract before the promulgation of the decision; but not after. Now, if you understand [R. Johanan to mean] that the dispute refers only to the time after the decision; but that prior thereto, all agree that he may retract, it is correct: then Raba's statement agrees with R. Johanan's, and is based on the view of the Rabbis. But should you say, The controversy holds good in both cases, who is Raba's authority?⁹  Hence it surely follows that the dispute arises only after the decision has been given. This proves it.

R. Nahman son of R. Hisda¹⁰  sent a question to R. Nahman b. Jacob: Will our Master please inform us, Is the dispute before or after the verdict, and with whom does the halachah rest? — He sent back word: The dispute arises after the promulgation of the decision, and the halachah agrees with the Sages. R. Ashi said: This was the question he sent: — Do they differ in the case of 'I will pay thee,' or in respect to 'It be remitted to thee', and with whom does the halachah rest? To which he replied: The dispute refers to, 'I will pay thee;' and the halachah rests with the Sages. Thus they taught in Sura. But in Pumbeditha they taught as follows: R. Hanina b. Shelamiah said: A message was sent from the school of Rab¹¹  to Samuel, saying: Will our Master please inform us, [If one of the parties pledged himself] by Kinyan¹²  [not to retract], what [if he seeks to retract] before the promulgation of the decision? — He returned word, saying: After Kinyan, nothing [can be done to repudiate the transaction].

MISHNAH. AND THESE ARE INELIGIBLE [TO BE WITNESSES OR JUDGES]: A GAMBLER WITH DICE,¹³  A USURER, A PIGEON-TRAINER,¹⁴  AND TRADERS [IN THE PRODUCE] OF THE SABBATICAL YEAR.¹⁵  R. SIMEON SAID: AT FIRST THEY CALLED THEM 'GATHERERS OF [THE PRODUCE OF] THE SABBATICAL YEAR.' BUT WHEN THE OPPRESSORS¹⁶  GREW IN NUMBER, THEY CHANGED THEIR NAME TO TRADERS IN THE SABBATICAL PRODUCE.'¹⁷  R. JUDAH SAID: WHEN IS THIS SO? — IF THEY HAVE NO OTHER OCCUPATION BUT THIS. BUT IF THEY HAVE OTHER MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD, THEY ARE ELIGIBLE.

GEMARA. What [wrong] does the dice player do? — Rammi b. Hama said: [He is disqualified] because it [sc. gambling] is an Asmakta,¹⁸  and Asmakta is not legally binding.¹⁹

R. Shesheth said: Such cases do not come under the category of Asmakta;²⁰  but the reason is that they [sc. dice players] are not concerned with the general welfare.²¹  Wherein do they differ? — If he [the gambler] acquired another trade.²²  We learnt:²³  R. JUDAH SAID: WHEN IS THIS SO? — IF THEY HAVE NO OTHER OCCUPATION BUT THIS. BUT IF THEY HAVE OTHER MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD, THEY ARE ELIGIBLE. This proves that the ruling of the Mishnah is for the sake of the welfare, of humanity, which refutes Rami b. Hama.²⁴  And should you answer, The Rabbis dispute R. Judah's opinion:²⁵  did not R. Joshua b. Levi say, Wherever R. Judah observes,

1. I.e., who meet the claim against them simply by an oath, since Biblical oaths were imposed on the defendant. Cf Shebu. 44b.
2. I.e., the plaintiff agrees to abandon his claim as the result of an irregular procedure, whether in the choice of judges or in the form of the oath. This shows that they differ also in respect of 'It be remitted to thee'.
3. E.g., where a labourer claims his wages when due, or where the defendant is legally incapable of taking an oath, e.g., if he is known to have committed perjury on a previous occasion. Cf. ibid.
4. According to the explanation thereof by Raba.
5. By accepting the judgment of people ineligible as judges.
6. For he must have felt certain that the plaintiff would take up his challenge.
7. By inverting the preceding argument.
8. V. p. 24.
9. In this case, it would only be R. Meir, in the opinion of Resh Lakish, who rules thus. But Raba could not abandon the majority ruling of the Rabbis and follow R. Meir. Nor can it be answered that Raba had an independent view of the circumstances in which they differ, as above, since his statement is not made regarding the Mishnah.
10. Or R. Isaac, according to another version.
11. Be Rab. For another possible meaning, v. p. 89.
12. Kinyan, lit., 'acquisition', is a formal act whereby one definitely pledges himself. V. Glos.
13. Heb. [G], Gr. [G] dice-playing, a popular game of antiquity. The term was applied by the Rabbis indiscriminately to any form of gambling. Cf. Shab. 149b.
14. Lit., 'pigeon flyers'. The exact meaning of 'pigeon-flyer' is discussed in the Gemara. The disqualification of these is based upon Ex. XXIII, 1: Put not thine hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. In this case, though they cannot be considered actual robbers, since they do not appropriate their gain by violence, the Rabbis nevertheless held such gain a form of robbery.
15. The Sages interpret Lev. XXV, 6: The Sabbath of the land shall be for food to you, to mean, 'for food' and not for 'commerce'. Cf. Bek. 12b. The transgressors of this enactment, because they showed so passionate a greed for gain, were not regarded as trustworthy to judge or testify.
16. Government officials who spared no means of extorting heavy taxation from the people. As a result, even the Sabbatical year produce had to be given in payment.
17. The meaning of this is discussed in the Gemara.
18. [H] 'speculation', from [H], 'to rely,' 'to support', is a term in civil law denoting a contract wherein each party promises to pay, on fulfilment of a certain condition which he expects will not be fulfilled. It is not binding according to some teachers, because the obligation has not been assumed with serious intent, since each hopes that his promise will be nullified by the non-realization of the condition. Gambling, as in this case, is an excellent example, for in it, A promises B to forfeit a certain object or amount on the realization of a condition which he hopes and expects will not occur.
19. I.e., does not create an actual obligation. Hence, the receiver is regarded as having taken illegal possession, and so is akin to a robber.
20. His definition of Asmakta is illustrated in B.B. 168a: If, for instance, A paid a fraction of his debt on a note to B, and told him to deposit the note with C, adding that if he did not pay the note by a certain date, C should return the note to B who would then collect the amount in full; and if on the due date A did not pay, R. Judah says that B may collect only the amount which was not paid, and not its full value, because A's promise is not valid, seeing that at the time he made it, he assumed that failure to pay would not occur. But in the case under consideration, where it is a game of chance, the odds in either case are equal, and A's intent to pay must be taken seriously. Consequently, the gain cannot be considered as a form of robbery.
21. I.e., they do not contribute to the stability of civilised society.
22. When, according to R. Shesheth, he should not be disqualified.
23. [So Ms.M. introducing a refutation of Rami b. Hama. Cur. edd. read, 'and we learnt'.]
24. Since he holds that the reason for their disqualification is Asmakta, irrespective of whether they have another trade or not.
25. In which case his argument agrees with that of the Rabbis, representing the anonymous opinion cited first in the Mishnah.