Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Nedarim

Folio 82a

Samuel said on Levi's authority: All vows the husband can annul to his wife, except 'my benefit [be forbidden] to so and so,' which he cannot annul.⁴  But he can annul [the vow], 'the benefit of so and so [be forbidden] to me.'⁵

We learnt: '[KONAM] BE THE FRUIT OF THIS COUNTRY TO ME,' HE CAN BRING HER THAT OF A DIFFERENT COUNTRY?⁶  — Said R. Joseph: It means that she vowed, '[KONAM BE THE FRUIT OF THIS COUNTRY TO ME] which you may bring'.⁷  Come and hear: 'KONAM BE THE FRUIT OF THIS SHOP-KEEPER TO ME,' HE CANNOT ANNUL? — Here too it means that she said, 'which you may bring.' [But does it not state:] BUT IF HE CAN OBTAIN SUSTENANCE ONLY FROM THIS SHOP-KEEPER, HE CAN ANNUL. Now if you maintain that she vowed, 'which you may bring,' why can he annul it?⁸  Hence, since the second clause must mean [even] those not brought by the husband, the first clause [too must refer to even] what she herself brings? — But in the first clause he cannot annul, though [her vow forbade even what] she herself brings;

1. I.e., if he divorces her.
2. Since the husband can annul vows of self-denial.
3. The Talmud leaves the problem unsolved and proceeds to another subject.
4. Not being a vow of mortification; this is self-evident, but is mentioned as a contrast to the next clause.
5. Though she may not be immediately in need thereof, she may need it later, and therefore it is a vow of mortification.
6. If abstention from the produce of an entire country is no mortification, surely to be forbidden benefit from a single person is none!
7. Hence there is no self-denial. But had she entirely forbidden them, it would certainly entail deprivation, and the same holds good if she forbids benefit from a single person.
8. Let some other person, or herself, obtain supplies.

Rab Judah said in Rab's name: If she vows [to abstain] from two loaves, [abstention from] one of which is self-denial, but not from the other:²  since he [the husband] can annul in respect of that which causes self-denial, he can also annul in respect of the other. R. Assi said in R. Johanan's name: He can annul only in respect of that which causes self-denial, but not in respect of the other. Others say, R. Assi asked R. Johanan: What if she vows [to abstain] from two loaves, [abstention from] one of which is self-denial, but not from the other? — He answered: He can annul in respect of that which causes self-denial, but not in respect of the other. He objected: If a woman made a vow of a nazirite, and drank wine or defiled herself through the dead,³

1. Because he may find it necessary to maintain his wife with the provisions of that particular tradesman, and by forbidding benefit from him, his wife puts him to inconvenience. — Now, to revert to the subject, since this is the view of R. Jose only, in the Rabbis' opinion he could annul it as a vow of self-denial, in which case the annulment is wider in scope, as stated on 79b, and Samuel's dictum is in accordance with the Rabbis (Rashi and Ran). Asheri and Tosaf. explain that there may be two different answers here. Thus: (i) The Mishnah is taught according to R. Jose, whereas Samuel's dictum agrees with the Rabbis. Alternatively, (ii) by HE CANNOT ANNUL is meant that he cannot annul it as a vow of self-denial, but as a vow affecting them both. But Asheri and Tosaf. disagree on the interpretation of (ii). Asheri: and therefore Samuel's dictum may agree even with R. Jose, for Samuel too meant that he can annul it only as a vow affecting their mutual interests. Tosaf.: alternatively, the first clause could accord even with the Rabbis, who agree with R. Jose that this is no vow of mortification, being so limited in scope, yet it may be annulled as a vow of mutual concern, and Samuel too meant it in the same way.
2. E.g., if one loaf was of fine flour and the other of coarse.
3. Both of which are forbidden to a nazirite, Num. VI, 3, 6.