Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite vow, we can understand why he can do this with his son but not with his daughter,3 but according to Resh Lakish, ought not the same to be true of a daughter? — He holds that it is his duty to train his son, but not to train his daughter. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why he can impose naziriteship [on his son], but not [ordinary] vows;4 but on Resh Lakish's view, why should he not be able [to impose ordinary] vows too? — [The Mishnah] argues progressively.5 Not only is it his duty to train [his son] by [imposing upon him] vows which do not make him unseemly, but it is even his duty to impose a naziriteship, although this will make him unseemly. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand how it teaches: IF HE PROTESTS OR HIS RELATIVES PROTEST ON HIS BEHALF [THE NAZIRITESHIP IS VOID];6 but on Resh Lakish's view, as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina, have relatives the power to tell [the father] not to instruct [the son] in religious duties? — He holds that [the son] objects to any training which is undignified.7 Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why [the boy] is permitted to poll,8 although [this means] rounding [the corners of the head];9 but on Resh Lakish's view as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina that it is in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, he would be [transgressing] in rounding [the corners of his head]?10 — [Resh Lakish] holds that the rounding of the whole head11 is [prohibited only by] a rabbinic enactment,12 and since training is [a duty] imposed by the Rabbis, [the duty as to] training imposed by the Rabbis can overrule the rabbinic enactment against rounding [the whole head]. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why [the boy] is allowed to poll and offer the sacrifices [of a nazirite]; but on the view of Resh Lakish as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina that it is in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, he would be bringing profane [animals] into the Temple court?13 — [Resh Lakish] holds that [the prohibition against the bringing of] ordinary animals into the Temple-court is not Scriptural.14 Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why if he contracts ritual defilement, he may bring an offering of a pair of birds, which the priest will eat after pinching off [the head];15 but on Resh Lakish's view, as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina, he will be eating carrion?16 — [Resh Lakish] agrees with R. Jose son of R. Judah that fowl do not require to be [ritually] slaughtered in Torah law, and considers that [the prohibition against bringing] non-sacred [fowl] into the Temple court is not Scriptural.17 Is this in fact R. Jose's opinion? Has it not been taught: R Jose son of R. Judah said: Whence do we infer that a sin-offering of fowl, brought in a doubtful case [of childbirth]18 is not to be eaten?19 From the verse, And of then that have an issue, whether it be a man or a woman.20 Woman is here compared to man.21 Just as a man is required to bring an offering for [a transgression],22 which has certainly been committed so must the woman bring an offering for [a childbirth] which has certainly occurred;23 and just as there is an offering to be brought by a man after a doubtful [transgression], so must an offering be brought by a woman after a doubtful [childbirth]. Again, just as a man brings [an offering of] the same kind in a case of doubtful [transgression] as he does after a certain one,24 so must a woman bring [an offering of] the same kind after a doubtful [childbirth] as she does after a certain one.25 [Shall we] then [infer further that] just as [in a doubtful case] a man brings an offering that is eaten,26 so is the offering brought by the woman to be eaten?
Nazir 29bYou cannot say so. Whilst this applies in the case of a man where only one forbidden act is involved,1 you cannot argue that this should also be the case with a woman where two forbidden acts are involved. Now what are the two forbidden acts referred to? Are they not the prohibition against the eating of carrion,2 and the prohibition against the entry of profane [sacrifices] into the Temple court?3R. Aha, the son of R. Ika [however] demurred [to this inference4 being drawn], for it is surely possible that [the eating was forbidden]5 because it would appear as though two rabbinic enactments were being transgressed.6 Can we say that [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is the same as that between [the following] Tannaim? [For it has been taught:] Rabbi says that he can impose a nazirite vow on his son until his majority;7 but R. Jose son of R. Judah says, [only] until he reaches the age of making vows [for himself].8 Now surely [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is the same as [that between these] Tannaim, Rabbi considering it to be a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, so that though [the son] may have reached the age of making vows [for himself, the father] can still impose a [nazirite] vow on him until he attains his majority, whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah who asserts [that he can do so only] until [the son] reaches the age of making vows [for himself] is of the opinion that [the father may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, and, now that he has passed out of his [father's] control,9 there is no longer an obligation [to train him]?10 — I will tell you; not at all. Both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah may] agree that this is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite. Where they differ is about [the vows of] one who can discriminate11 [but] who has not quite reached manhood. Rabbi considers that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood is [permitted to make vows] only by enactment of the Rabbis and so the right granted by the Torah [to the parent]12 overrules the Rabbinical right [of the youth];13 whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah considers that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, has a Scriptural right [to make vows].14 Alternatively, it may be that both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah] would agree that [the father may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, and that [the right of a youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, [to make vows] is Rabbinic. Rabbi, on the one hand, holds that [the parent's duty] to train, which is itself Rabbinic, overrules [the right of the youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, [to make vows for himself] which is also Rabbinic;15 whilst R. Jose son of R. Judah, who says [that the father's right lasts only] until [the lad] reaches the age of making vows, holds that the Rabbinic duty to train [the lad] does not set aside [the right of a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood [to make his own vows, although this is also Rabbinic].16 Can we say that [the controversy between] the above Tannaim17 is the same as that between the following Tannaim?18 For it has been taught: It is related that R. Hanina's father once imposed a nazirite vow upon him and then brought him before R. Gamaliel. R. Gamaliel was about to examine him to discover whether or not he had reached his majority19 — according to R. Jose20 it was to discover whether he had reached the age of making vows21 — when [the young Hanina] said to him, 'Sir, do not exert yourself to examine me. If I am a minor, then I am a nazirite because of my father's [imposition], whilst if I am an adult,22 I undertake it on my own account.' Thereupon R. Gamaliel rose and kissed him upon his head, and said, 'I am certain that this [lad] will be a religious leader23 in Israel.' It is said that in a very short space of time, he became in fact a religious leader in Israel.24 Now on R. Jose son of R. Judah's view that [the father's control lasts only] until [the boy] reaches the age at which he can make vows [for himself], we can understand why he should have said, 'If I am a minor,25 I shall be [a nazirite] because of my father's [action, and so on].' But on Rabbi's view that [it lasts] until manhood, [of what value was the statement], 'whilst if I am an adult, I undertake it on my own account,' - To Next Folio -
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