Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 97a

who, if he takes them as a gift, has not the same advantage [as if he had taken them for his debt].¹

In what manner does [a widow] sell [her deceased husband's property] for her maintenance?²  — R. Daniel son of R. Kattina replied in the name of R. Huna: She sells [portions of it] once in twelve months³  and the buyer supplies her maintenance [in instalments]⁴  once every thirty days. Rab Judah, however, stated: She sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days.

It was taught in agreement with R. Huna: [A widow] sells⁵  once in twelve months and the buyer supplies her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days. It was also taught in agreement with Rab Judah: [A widow] sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days.

Amemar said: The law is that [a widow] sells [sufficient land to suffice her] for six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days. Said R. Ashi to Amemar: What [about the ruling] of R. Huna? — 'I', the other replied, 'have not heard of it', by which he meant,⁶  'I do not approve of it'.

R. Shesheth was asked: May [a widow] who sold [land] for her maintenance subsequently distrain on it⁷  for her kethubah? This question was raised on [the basis of a ruling of] R. Joseph who stated, 'If a widow has sold [any of her deceased husband's estate]⁸  the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans,⁹  and if the court sold [any such property] the responsibility for the indemnity again falls upon the orphans'¹⁰  What [then, it was asked, is the ruling]? May she, since the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans, distrain [on the land],¹¹  or is it possible that [the buyers] may tell her,¹²  'Granted that you have not accepted general¹³  responsibility for indemnity, did you not indeed accept responsibility [against distraint] by yourself either?'¹⁴  — You, he replied, have learned it: '[A widow]¹⁵  may continue to sell¹⁶  until [only the estate of] the value of her kethubah [remains], and this is a support to her since she might thus collect her kethubah from the residue'. Thus¹⁷  it may be inferred that only if she left [estate corresponding to the value of her kethubah] may¹⁸  [she collect her kethubah]. but if she did not leave [so much of the estate,¹⁹  she may] not.²⁰  But is it not possible that he²¹  was merely tendering good advice, in order that people might not call her a swindler?²²  — If so,²³  he²¹  should have stated, 'She collects her kethubah from the remainder', why [then did he also add,] 'A support to her'? Consequently it must be inferred that only if she left [estate corresponding to the value of her kethubah] may¹⁸  [the widow collect her kethubah], but if she did not leave [so much¹⁹  she may] not.²⁰

The question was raised: If a man sold [a plot of land]²⁴  but [on concluding the sale] he was no longer in need of money, may his sale²⁵  be withdrawn²⁶  or not?²⁷  Come and hear: There was a certain man who sold a plot of land to R. Papa because he was in need of money to buy some oxen, and, as eventually he did not need it, R. Papa actually returned the land to him! — [This is no proof since] R. Papa may have acted beyond the strict requirements of the law.²⁸

Come and hear: There was once a dearth at Nehardea²⁹  when all the people sold their mansions,³⁰  but when eventually wheat arrived³¹  R. Nahman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners! — There also the sales were made in error since it eventually became known that the ship³²  was³³  waiting in the bays.³⁴  If that is so,³⁵  how [explain] what Rami b. Samuel said to R. Nahman, 'If [you rule] thus you will cause them³⁶  trouble in the future',³⁷  [whereupon] he replied, 'Is dearth a daily occurrence?' and to which the former retorted, 'Yes, a dearth at Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence'?³⁸

And the law is that if a man sold [a plot of land]³⁹  and [on concluding the sale] was no longer in need of money the sale may be withdrawn.

MISHNAH. A WIDOW, WHETHER [HER HUSBAND DIED] AFTER [HER] BETROTHAL⁴⁰  OR AFTER [HER] MARRIAGE⁴¹  MAY SELL [OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE] WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN. R. SIMEON RULED: [IF HER HUSBAND DIED] AFTER MARRIAGE⁴¹  SHE MAY SELL⁴²  [OF HIS ESTATE] WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN,⁴³  [BUT IF ONLY] AFTER [HER] BETROTHAL, SHE MAY NOT SELL [ANY OF THE ESTATE] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN, SINCE SHE IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE, AND ONE WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE MAY NOT SELL [SUCH PROPERTY] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.

GEMARA. One can readily see [that the privilege⁴⁴  of a woman who was widowed] AFTER MARRIAGE is due to [her immediate need for] maintenance;⁴⁵

1. A debt may be distrained for on sold property, but a gift may not. Similarly with the widow, by omitting, in agreement with the ruling of R. Jose, the specification of the purpose of her sales, she retains the right to distrain on her deceased husband's sold property by advancing the plea that her own sales had been made for the purpose of her maintenance (which cannot, of course, be distrained for on such property) and that she was now seeking to recover her kethubah to which such property is pledged. To protect herself against the plea of the orphans that her kethubah also was paid out of her sales, she might arrange for witnesses to he present when the sales for her maintenance take place and when she makes a verbal declaration to that effect.
2. [H], so MS.M. Cur. edd. omit the word.
3. Sufficient to Provide for her maintenance during all that period.
4. He must not pay the full price in one instalment in order that he may be enabled, should the widow marry before she receives all the instalments, to hand over the balance to the orphans.
5. Portions of her deceased husband's estate.
6. Lit.,'as if to say'.
7. On the very land she has sold.
8. To reimburse herself for her maintenance or kethubah, but guaranteeing indemnity to the buyer.
9. Since it is they who are responsible for the widow's kethubah and maintenance.
10. Infra 100a.
11. Though she herself had sold it; and refer the buyers to the orphans.
12. When she proceeds to distrain on the land she sold them.
13. Lit., 'of the world', sc. if other claimants distrained on the land.
14. And, consequently. she is not allowed to distrain on such property.
15. To provide for her maintenance.
16. Portions of her deceased husband's estate.
17. Since according to this ruling the widow must have recourse to the residue.
18. Lit., 'yes'.
19. But sold all of it.
20. Collect her kethubah by distraining on the lands she sold.
21. The author of the Baraitha, in ruling that a portion of the estate corresponding to the value of the kethubah must remain unsold.
22. Lit., 'retractor'. Legally. however, she may well distrain on the property of such buyers.
23. If the ruling was in the nature of advice.
24. For the sole reason that he needed money for some specific purpose.
25. Since he no longer needed the money.
26. On the ground of being a sale made in error.
27. Owing to the fact that at the time of the sale the seller was still in need of money.
28. [H] lit., 'within the line of the law', i.e., he surrendered his legal right for the sake of benefiting a fellow man; v. B.K. Sonc. ed. p. 584, n. 2.
29. V. supra p. 222, n. 8.
30. To use the proceeds for the purchase of wheat.
31. And prices fell so that the sellers of the mansions were no longer in need of the money.
32. That carried the grain.
33. At the time the sales were effected.
34. Sheltering until the subsidence of the high water. Had these sellers been aware of the fact that the ship was so near they would never have thought of selling their mansions. Such sales may, therefore, be regarded as sales in error, which may be withdrawn. The question under discussion, however, refers to a seller who was actually in need of money when his sale was effected (v. p. 616, n. 16) and whose release came only after the sale.
35. That the reason for R. Nahman's ruling was that the ship was already in the bays at the time the sales were arranged. So according to Rashb. (v. Tosaf. s. v. [H], a.l.) contra Rashi who takes this argument to he in support of the reason given for R. Nahman's ruling.
36. The sellers.
37. Because they will not be able to find buyers.
38. Granted the frequency of dearth at Nehardea, the detention of the provision ships in the bays is obviously of no common occurrence. Consequently it must be concluded that R. Nahman's reason for the cancellation of the sales was not because 'the ship was in the bays' but because the sellers, though in need of money when the sales were arranged, had no need of the money subsequently, such cases being of frequent occurrence.
39. V. supra p. 616, n. 13.
40. When her claim is restricted to that of her kethubah only (v. our Mishnah infra).
41. When she claims also maintenance.
42. For her maintenance.
43. Since she cannot be expected to starve until Beth din find time to deal with her case.
44. To SELL … WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF BETH DIN.
45. Cf. supra n. 4.

what, however, is the reason¹  [for conferring this privilege²  upon one widowed] after betrothal?³  — 'Ulla replied: In order to [enhance the] attractions⁴  [of matrimony].⁵  R. Johanan replied: Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court. What is the practical difference between them?⁶  — The practical difference between them is the case of a divorced woman. For according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]' a divorced woman also may⁷  claim [the privilege⁸  of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness; but according to him who replied, 'Because no man Wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' a divorced woman [is not entitled to the privilege since] the man does not care [for her dignity].

We learned: And a divorced woman may not sell [of her former husband's estate]⁹  except with the sanction of Beth din.¹⁰  Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' the ruling is well justified since for a divorced wife one does not care; but according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractions [of matrimony'. why should not] a divorced woman¹¹  also be entitled to claim [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness? — This represents the view of R. Simeon.¹²  If [this represents the view of] R. Simeon [the objection arises: Was not this principle] already laid down in the earlier clause, AFTER HER BETROTHAL SHE MAY NOT SELL etc.?¹³  — It might have been presumed [that his ruling applied] Only to a woman widowed after [her] betrothal, since in her case there was not much affection,¹⁴  but that a divorced woman, in whose case there was much affection,¹⁵  may¹⁶  demand [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attraction.¹⁷  But have we not learned this¹⁸  also: WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE which includes,¹⁹  does it not, a divorced woman?²⁰  — No, [it includes one who is both] divorced²¹  and' not divorced,²²  as [the one spoken of by] R. Zera who stated: Wherever the Sages described a woman as both divorced and not divorced²²  her husband is responsible for her maintenance.²³

Come and hear: As she²⁴  may sell [of her deceased husband's estate] without [the sanction of] Beth din so may her heirs, those who inherit her kethubah, sell [such property] without [the sanction of] Beth din. Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' one can well see the reason for this ruling;²⁵  for as it is disagreeable to him²⁶  that she should suffer indignity so it is also disagreeable to him that her heirs should suffer indignity. According to him, however, who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]', what [consideration for] attractiveness [it may be objected] could there be in respect of her heirs?²⁷  — 'Ulla interpreted this [to be a case where] her daughter, for instance, or her sister, Was her heir.²⁸

MISHNAH. [A WIDOW WHO] SOLD HER KETHUBAH OR PART OF IT, OR PLEDGED IT OR PART OF IT, OR PRESENTED IT OR PART OF IT, TO A STRANGER, MAY NOT SELL THE RESIDUE [OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE]²⁹  EXCEPT WITH (THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.³⁰  THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: SHE MAY SELL [THE LAND PLEDGED FOR HER KETHUBAH] EVEN IN FOUR OR FIVE INSTALMENTS³¹  AND [IN THE MEANTIME]³²  SHE MAY SELL [OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE TO PROVIDE] FOR HER MAINTENANCE WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN, ENTERING, [HOWEVER, IN THE DEED OF SALE,] 'I SOLD [THE LAND TO PROVIDE] FOR MY MAINTENANCE'.³³  A DIVORCED WOMAN, HOWEVER, MUST NOT SELL [SUCH PROPERTY] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.

GEMARA. Who [is the author of the first ruling in] our Mishnah?³⁴  — It is R. Simeon. For it was taught: If a woman sold [all] her kethubah or pledged it, or mortgaged [the land that was pledged for] her kethubah to a stranger, she is not entitled to maintenance.³⁵  R. Simeon ruled: Even if she did not sell or pledge [all] her kethubah, but half of it only, she loses her maintenance.³⁶  Does this³⁷  then imply that R. Simeon holds the view that we do not regard part of the amount³⁸  as being legally equal to the full amount, while the Rabbis maintain that part of the amount is legally regarded as the full amount? But, [it may be objected], have we not in fact heard the reverse? For was It not taught: And he³⁹  shall take a wife its her virginity⁴⁰  excludes one who is adolescent⁴¹  [some of whose] virginity is ended; so R. Meir. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon permit⁴²  [the marriage] of one who is adolescent?⁴³  — There⁴⁴  they differ [on the interpretation] of Scriptural texts,⁴⁵  R. Meir being of the opinion that 'virgin'⁴⁶  implies even [one who retains] some of her virginity; 'her virginity'⁴⁷  implies only one who retains all her virginity;⁴⁸  'in her virginity'⁴⁹  implies only⁵⁰  [when previous intercourse with her took place] in a natural manner,⁵¹  but not when in an unnatural manner.⁵²  R. Eleazar and R. Simeon, however, are of the opinion that 'virgin' would have implied a perfect virgin; 'her virginity' implies even [one who retains] only part of her virginity;

1. Of the first Tanna of our Mishnah.
2. As far as her kethubah is concerned.
3. Why should not a claim of this nature (cf. supra note 1) be subject to the jurisdiction of a court just as that of any other claimants?
4. Lit., 'grace'.
5. In the absence of the privilege some women might refuse to consent to their betrothal; v. supra 84a.
6. 'Ulla and R. Johanan.
7. Since the privilege is not dependent on the husband's feelings.
8. V. supra note 8.
9. To reimburse herself for her kethubah.
10. Mishnah infra.
11. Since the privilege is not dependent on the husband's feelings.
12. Who, as follows from his ruling in our Mishnah, does not recognize the principle of providing for matrimonial attractiveness.
13. Cf. supra n. 4' Why then should the same principle be repeated?
14. Lit., 'her favour (in the eyes of the husband) was not much'. Her husband having died before he married her. As no woman would expect privileges after such a slight matrimonial relationship there was Do need to confer the privilege (v. supra p. 618, n. 5) upon such a widow,
15. Cf. previous note mutatis mutandis. V. Tosaf. s.v, [H] a.l. for two other interpretations.
16. Even according to R. Simeon.
17. Hence the necessity for the two rulings.
18. The case of a divorced woman.
19. Lit., 'to include what?'
20. After her marriage. It cannot refer to a woman divorced after her betrothal since her case could be inferred a minori ad majus from that of A WIDOW … AFTER HER BETROTHAL.
21. After betrothal.
22. One, for instance, to whom the husband has thrown a letter of divorce in a public thoroughfare and it is uncertain whether it fell nearer to her or to him (v. Git. 74a).
23. Our. Mishnah thus teaches that the husband's responsibility for the maintenance of a woman in such circumstances ceases with his death, and his orphans, therefore, are under no obligation to maintain her out of his estate. She is well entitled to maintenance during his lifetime since it is through him that she is prevented from contracting a second marriage; but after his death, when she is free to marry again, her claim which was all the time of a doubtful nature must lapse.
24. A widow.
25. The right of the heirs to sell without the sanction of Beth din.
26. The husband.
27. Who as a rule are males (cf. Rashi). A female enjoys the right of inheritance only in the absence of males.
28. In whose case the consideration of rendering matrimony attractive must be reckoned with.
29. For her maintenance.
30. This is the view of R. Simeon (v. Gemara infra).
31. Lit., 'times'.
32. Before the last instalment is sold.
33. Such insertion being in certain cases advantageous for the woman (as explained supra 96b).
34. According to which a widow who sold even only part of her kethubah may not sell of her husband's estate without the sanction of Beth din.
35. Tosef. Keth. XI, supra 54a. If. however, she sold etc. a part of it only she is still entitled to maintenance. Cur. edd. insert here in parentheses, 'these are the words of R. Meir', a sentence which is wanting in the Tosefta. Rashi retains it.
36. Tosef. Keth. XI; as she loses her maintenance she may not sell without the sanction of Beth din. Cf. supra n. 4 and Rashi on our Mishnah, s.v. [H] Rashal actually inserts in the text 'and the rest she may not sell except with the sanction of Beth din', a reading which was apparently wanting in Rashi's text as well as in cut. edd., but was known to the Tosafists (v. Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
37. The dispute between R. Simeon and the Rabbis according to which the former regards the absence of a part as the absence of the whole while the latter do not.
38. Sc. of the kethubah. Lit., 'silver' with reference to Ex. XXII, 17.
39. A High Priest.
40. Lev. XXI, 13.
41. A bogereth (v. Glos.).
42. A High Priest.
43. Yeb. 595. The absence of a part of her virginity not being regarded as the absence of all virginity. Thus it follows that, while R. Simeon does not regard the absence of a part as the absence of the whole, the Rabbis do, which is the reverse of their respective views here (v. p. 621, n. 7).
44. In the Baraitha cited from Yeb.
45. Not on the question whether a part legally equals the whole.
46. [H].
47. [H].
48. Which excludes the one who is adolescent some of whose virginity is ended.
49. [H] (Lev. XXI, 13)
50. Lit., 'yes'.
51. Is she forbidden to a High Priest.
52. The superfluous c (='in') in [H] implies intercourse in the place of virginity. Unnatural intercourse with a na'arah (v. Glos) whereby virginity is not affected, is consequently excluded.