Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 70a

It is that of R. Meir¹  who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man.²

R. Hisda stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba: The law is that whether [the dying man] said, 'Give' or 'give no more',³  his children are to he given all that they require. But have we not, however, an established principle that the halachah is in agreement with R. Meir who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man? — This applies to other matters, but in this case [the father] is quite satisfied [that his children should be provided with all they need]; and in limiting their allowance,⁴  his object was⁵  to encourage them.⁶

We learned elsewhere: With regard to little children,⁷  their purchase is a valid purchase and their sale is a valid sale in the case of movable objects.⁸  Rafram explained: This has been taught in the case only where no guardian had been appointed,⁹  but where a guardian had been appointed neither their purchase nor their sale has any legal validity. Whence is this inferred? From the expression, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. But might not the case where a trustee¹⁰  had been appointed be different?¹¹  — If so,¹²  it should have been stated, 'IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, a trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust' what [then was the purpose of the expression,] THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR? Hence it may be inferred [that the same law is applicable] in all cases.¹³

CHAPTER VII

MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW TO HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST] NOT MORE¹⁴  THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT A STEWARD,¹⁵  BUT IF FOR A LONGER PERIOD HE MUST DIVORCE HER¹⁶  AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE¹⁷  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH, BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS. IF HE WAS A PRIEST¹⁸  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS,¹⁹  BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] THREE.

IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT²⁰  HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE¹⁷  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY, [BUT IF FOR] TWO DAYS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. IF, HOWEVER, HE WAS A PRIEST¹⁸  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] TWO DAYS [BUT IF FOR] THREE HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH.

IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF A CERTAIN ADORNMENT²¹  HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JOSE RULED: [THIS²²  APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT²³  IS GIVEN, AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT²³  IS] THIRTY DAYS.

GEMARA. Since, however, he²⁴  is under an obligation to [maintain] her²⁵  how can he forbid her by a vow [to have any benefit from him]? Has he then the power²⁶  to cancel his obligation? Surely we have learned: [If a woman said to her husband] 'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth' he need not annul her vow;²⁷  from which²⁸  it is evident that, as she is under an obligation to him,²⁹  she has no right to cancel her obligation,³⁰  similarly here, since he is under an obligation to [maintain] her he should have no right to cancel his obligation!³¹  — [This,] however, [is the right explanation:] As he³²  is entitled to say to her,³³  'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance'³⁴

1. Expressed in our Mishnah by the ruling that despite the request of the daughter the trustee must carry out the instructions of her deceased father.
2. Cf. Git. 14b, 15a and 40a.
3. Cf. supra 69b ad fin.
4. Lit., 'and (as to) that which be said thus'.
5. Lit., 'he came'.
6. To lead a thrifty life and to make an effort to earn their livelihood.
7. Of the ages of nine and eight' (Rashi. a.l. s.v. [H].). 'six and seven' (Rashb. B.B. 155b, s.v. [H]).
8. Transactions in landed estate, however, may be made by such only as have produced signs of puberty or have attained the age of twenty, v. Git. 59a, 65a, B.B. l.e.
9. By a father or the court.
10. With definite instructions as to the use he was to make of the trust money.
11. From an ordinary guardian who is expected to use his own discretion in the best interests of the orphans. In the latter case the orphan's transaction might be deemed valid because it is not against their father's instructions and, being in the interest of the orphans, the guardian might well be presumed to have acquiesced.
12. That a distinction is to be drawn between a trustee with special instructions and an ordinary guardian.
13. Where there is a guardian, whose charge is somewhat similar to that of a trustee. Lit., 'even in the world'.
14. Lit., 'until'.
15. To supply his wife's maintenance.
16. I.e., if the woman demands her freedom.
17. Who, unlike a priest (v. Lev. XXI, 7), may remarry his divorced wife.
18. Cf. supra n. 4.
19. A priest was allowed more time in order to afford him a longer period of retracting before his divorce separates her from him for ever.
20. He confirmed a vow she had made to that effect (Rashi). Though he has no right to forbid his wife the eating or tasting of any foodstuffs he may, by keeping silent when she herself makes such a vow, confirm it; v. Num. XXX, 7ff. Others: He vowed to abstain from his wife should she taste a certain fruit; v. Isaiah Trani.
21. Cf. supra n. 7 mutatis mutandis.
22. That in the case of a vow against a wife's adornments, the husband must DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH.
23. To the duration of the vow.
24. A husband.
25. His wife.
26. Lit., 'all (power) as if from him?'
27. Supra 59a and notes.
28. Since no annulment is required.
29. A wife's handiwork belongs to her husband.
30. In consequence of which her vow is null and void and requires no annulment.
31. And his vow also should, therefore, be null and void.
32. A husband.
33. His wife.
34. I.e., he would neither maintain her nor expect her to give him her handiwork (v. supra n. 8).

he [in making his vow] is regarded¹  as having said to her, 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance'.

If, however, one is to adopt the ruling R. Huna gave in the name of Rab, for R. Huna stated in the name of Rab: A wife may say to her husband, 'I would neither be maintained by, nor work [for you]', why should there be no need to annul [her vow] when she said 'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth'? Let it rather be said that as she is entitled to say, 'I would neither be maintained by nor work [for you]' she [in making her vow] might be regarded¹  as having said, 'I would neither be maintained by, nor work [for you]'?²  — [The fact,] however, [is that] the explanation is not that 'he is regarded'³  but that he actually said to her, 'Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance.' If so,⁴  what need has she of a steward?⁵  — [She needs one] where [the proceeds of her handiwork] do not suffice.⁶  If, [however, her handiwork] does not suffice,⁷  our original question arises again!⁸  R. Ashi replied: [This is a case] where [her handiwork] suffices for major requirements but does not suffice for minor requirements.

How is one to understand these 'minor requirements'? If the woman is in the habit of having them, they are, surely, a part of her regular requirements,⁹  and if she is not used to them¹⁰  what need has she for a steward?¹¹  — [The law concerning a steward] is required only where she was used [to them] in her father's house but consented to dispense with them when with her husband.¹²  In such a case she can say to him, 'Hitherto, before you forbade me by a vow [to have any benefit from you], I was willing to put up with your [mode of living], but now that you have forbidden me [to enjoy any benefit from you] I am not able to put up [any longer] with your [mode of living]'. And wherein lies the difference [between a vow for more, and one for] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS? — [Within a period of] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS people would not become aware of it, and the matter would be no degradation to her; but after a longer period¹³  people would hear of it, and the matter would be degrading to her.

If you prefer I might reply: [His vow¹⁴  is valid] only if he vowed while she was merely betrothed to him.¹⁵  But has a betrothed woman, however, any claim to maintenance?¹⁶  — [Yes], if the time [for the celebration of the marriage] arrived and she was¹⁷  not married. For we have learned: If the respective periods expired¹⁸  and they were not married,¹⁹  they²⁰  are entitled to maintenance²¹  out of the man's estate, and [if he is a priest] may also eat terumah.²²  Wherein then lies the difference [between a vow for more, and one for] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS? — [During a period of] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS an agent²³  performs his mission; for a longer period no agent performs his mission.

And if you prefer I might reply: [The husband's vow²⁴  is valid] when he made it while she was betrothed to him and she was [afterwards] married.

But if she was married [afterwards] she must obviously have understood her position and accepted it!²⁵  — [It is a case] where she pleaded, 'I thought I shall be able to bear it but now I cannot bear it'.

But granted that such a plea²⁶  is properly admissible²⁷  in respect of bodily defects;²⁸  is it admissible, however, in respect of maintenance?²⁹  — Clearly, then, we can only explain as we explained at first.

HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT A STEWARD. Does not the steward, however, act on his³⁰  behalf?³¹  — R. Huna replied: [Our Mishnah refers] to one who declared, 'Whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss'.³²  But, even if be spoke in such a manner, is not the steward acting on his behalf? Have we not learned: If a man who was thrown into a pit cried that whosoever should hear his voice should write a letter of divorce for his wife, [the hearers]³³  may lawfully³⁴  write, and deliver [it to his wife]?³⁵  — How now! there³⁶  the man said, 'should write';³⁷  but did the man here³⁸  say, 'should maintain'? All he said was, 'whoever will maintain'.³⁹

But surely R. Ammi said: In [the case of] a fire [breaking] out on the Sabbath]⁴⁰  permission was given to make the announcement 'Whosoever shall extinguish it will suffer no loss'.⁴¹  Now what does [the expression] 'In a fire'⁴²  exclude? Does it not exclude a case of this kind?⁴³  — No; [it was meant] to exclude other acts that are forbidden on the Sabbath.⁴⁴

Rabbah raised an objection: If a man is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from another man, and he has nothing to eat [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other.⁴⁵  Only such [a suggestion]⁴⁶  is permitted but not that of 'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss'?⁴⁷  — [The formula,] 'There is no question' is here implied:⁴⁸  There is no question [that a man may announce,] 'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss', since he is speaking to no one in particular;⁴⁹  but even in this case where, since he is familiar with him⁵⁰  and goes and speaks to him directly, [it might have been thought that his mere suggestion is] the same as if he had expressly told him,⁵⁰  'You go and give him',⁵¹  hence we were taught [that this also is permitted].

[To revert to] the main text.⁵²  If a man is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from another man, and he has nothing to eat, [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other.⁵³  If his⁵⁴  house is to be built, his wall to be put up or his field to be harvested [the other] may go to labourers with whom he is familiar and say to them, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. They may then work for him and recover⁵⁵  their wages from the other. If they were going on the same journey and the one had with him nothing to eat, [the other]⁵⁶  may give [some food] to a third⁵⁷  person as a gift and the first may take it [from that person] and eat it.⁵⁸  If no third person⁵⁷  is available, he⁵⁶  may put the food upon a stone or a wall, and say, 'Behold this is free⁵⁹  for all who desire [to take it]', and the other⁶⁰  may take it and eat it.⁶¹  R. Jose, however, forbids this.⁶²  Raba said: What is R. Jose's reason? — [It is forbidden as] a preventive measure against

1. Lit., 'is made'.
2. And her vow should be valid. Why then has it been said that her husband 'need not annul her vow'?
3. Lit., 'do not say; be is made'.
4. That her handiwork is not taken away from her.
5. The proceeds of her handiwork could be spent on her maintenance.
6. To make up the legally prescribed sum (v. supra 64b).
7. And it is, therefore, still her husband's duty to maintain her in part.
8. How can he by his vow cancel an obligation that is incumbent upon him?
9. Lit., 'she is used to them'.
10. Being mere luxuries.
11. The husband, surely, is not expected to provide for such luxuries.
12. Lit., 'roll' with him', i.e., to put up with his mode of living.
13. Lit., 'more'.
14. That his wife shall not HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM.
15. When he is under no obligation to maintain her.
16. Certainly not (v. supra n. 13). What need then was there to state the obvious?
17. Lit., 'they were'. V. n. 2.
18. Lit., 'the time (for the respective marriages referred to supra 57a) arrived'.
19. Through the man's delay.
20. The women mentioned.
21. In accordance with a Rabbinical ordinance.
22. Mishnah supra 57a. Since in such circumstances the man is Pentateuchally under no obligation to maintain his betrothed his vow forbidding her to have any benefit is valid; and as he is obliged to maintain her in accordance with Rabbinic law he must appoint a steward to look after her maintenance.
23. The steward appointed (v. our Mishnah).
24. V. supra p. 435, n. 12.
25. What claim then could she advance?
26. Mistaken judgment.
27. Lit., 'that we say so'.
28. Though a woman at first consented to live with the man who suffered from such defects she may subsequently plead that she under-estimated her feeling and that now she cannot bear them (v. infra 77a). A woman may well be excused her first error of judgment in such circumstances.
29. No woman, surely, could plead that she was not aware that a person could live without food. As she has once accepted the disability she should not be entitled to change her mind.
30. The husband's.
31. Lit., 'do his mission'. The answer being in the affirmative, the question arises why his agent should be allowed to do on his behalf what he himself is not allowed to do.
32. He would reimburse him.
33. Though they have received no direct instructions.
34. Lit., 'behold these'.
35. Git. 66a; as if they had been agents who had received direct instructions from him. Similarly the steward spoken of in our Mishnah should be regarded as the husband's agent (v. supra p. 436, n. 15).
36. The case of divorce.
37. A definite instruction.
38. In the matter of maintenance.
39. This is not even an indirect instruction but a mere intimation. Anyone acting on such an intimation only cannot be regarded as agent.
40. When a Jew is forbidden to do any work himself or to instruct someone else, even a Gentile, to do it for him.
41. Shab. 121a.
42. Implying a fire only and not other cases.
43. A person's announcement concerning compensation for the maintenance of his wife whom he himself is forbidden to maintain, or any similar announcements which might lead someone to perform on behalf of that person what he himself is forbidden to do.
44. The sanctity of the Sabbath demands greater restrictions which need not he applied to other prohibitions such as those of vows for instance.
45. Ned. 43a. Lit., 'gives to him and comes and takes from this'.
46. Which is rather vague and non-committal.
47. Which is more explicit and a committal undertaking. An objection against R. Huna.
48. Lit., 'be (the Tanna of that Mishnah) said'.
49. Lit., 'to the world'.
50. The shopkeeper.
51. And, thereby becoming his virtual agent, be should, like himself, be forbidden to supply any provisions.
52. Of the citation from Ned. 43a.
53. V. supra p. 437, n. 14.
54. The man who is forbidden to have benefit from the other by a vow.
55. Lit., 'and come and take'.
56. Benefit from whom he is forbidden to derive.
57. Lit., 'another'.
58. Cf. infra n. 16.
59. Lit., 'they are ownerless property'.
60. V. supra note 9.
61. MS.M. omits [H] ('and it is permitted') which seems superfluous here as well as supra. V. supra n. 13.
62. V. Ned. 43a.