Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Horayoth

Folio 2a

CHAPTER I

MISHNAH. IF THE COURT¹  RULED THAT 'ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED, AND AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR,²  IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, WHETHER THEY³  ACTED [THUS]⁴  AND HE ACTED WITH THEM⁵  OR THEY ACTED⁴  AND HE ACTED AFTER THEM OR EVEN IF THEY DID NOT ACT⁴  AND HE ACTED,⁴  HE IS EXEMPT,⁶  BECAUSE HE RELIED ON [A RULING OF] THE COURT. [IF, HOWEVER, WHEN] THE COURT ISSUED [AN ERRONEOUS] RULING ONE OF THEM,³  WHO KNEW THAT THEY HAD ERRED, OR A DISCIPLE WHO WAS HIMSELF CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW, PROCEEDED AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, WHETHER THEY³  ACTED⁴  AND HE⁷  ACTED WITH THEM OR THEY ACTED AND HE ACTED AFTER THEM OR THEY DID NOT ACT AND HE ACTED,⁴  HE IS LIABLE,⁸  SINCE HE⁹  WAS NOT DEPENDENT UPON [THE RULING OF] THE COURT. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE WHO IS [IN A POSITION] TO RELY UPON HIMSELF IS SUBJECT TO A PENALTY, AND [ONLY] HE WHO MUST DEPEND UPON THE COURT IS EXEMPT.⁶

GEMARA. Samuel said: A court is never responsible¹⁰  unless they ruled.¹¹  'You are permitted'.¹²  R. Dimi of Nehardea said: Unless they ruled, 'You are permitted to act'. What is the reason? — Because [otherwise]¹³  the decision is not final.

Said Abaye: We also have learned the same: If he¹⁴  returned to his [home] town and continued to teach as he had taught,¹⁵  he is exonerated. If, however, he issued instructions [for the public] to act,¹⁶  he is subject to the penalty.¹⁷

Said R. Abba: We also have learned the same: If the court decided¹⁸  that she¹⁹  may be married, and she went and contracted a forbidden union,²⁰  she²¹  must bring an offering, because the court permitted her only to marry.²²

Rabina said: We also have learned the same: IF THE COURT RULED THAT ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED.²³  Nothing more [need be said about it].

Some read as follows:²⁴  Samuel said: A court is not responsible unless they' ruled, 'You are permitted to act'.²⁵  R. Dimi of Nehardea said.' Even [if the ruling was], 'You are permitted' the decision is [regarded as] final. But surely, said Abaye, we have not so learnt: If he returned to his [home] town and continued to teach as he had taught he is exonerated. If, however, he issued instructions [for the public] to act, he is subject to penalty!²⁶  But surely, said R. Abba, we have not so learned: If the court decided that she may be married and she went and committed adultery, she must bring an offering, because the court permitted her only to be married!²⁷  But surely, said Rabina, We have not so learned: IF THE COURT RULED THAT ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED!²⁷  Nothing more [need be said about it].

AND AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING. Let it be taught, AND HE ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING; what need was there for²⁸  THROUGH ERROR! — Raba replied: [The addition of] THROUGH ERROR [was meant] to include [the following case]. If the court ruled that suet²⁹  was permitted [to be eaten], and a person mistook³⁰  suet for fat and ate it,³¹  he is exonerated;³²  [while] ACCORDING TO THEIR RULING [implies] at their actual ruling.³³

Others read [as follows]. Raba said: Only a person who ACTED THROUGH ERROR [NAMELY] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING IS EXONERATED, but he who mistook suet for fat³⁴  and ate it is liable.³⁵

That which was obvious to Raha was raised by Rami b. Hama as a question. For Rami b Hima isked.' What [is the law where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook it for fat³⁶  and ate it?³⁷  — Raba replied: Come and hear: AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING etc. Why should it be necessary to state³⁸  THROUGH ERROR [and also] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING.³⁹  Obviously⁴⁰  to include [the following case]: Where the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook suet for fat and ate it, he is exonerated!⁴¹  — Perhaps [it may be retorted, our Mishnah means to] exempt a person only when he ACTED THROUGH ERROR [namely] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, but when he mistook suet for fat and ate it he is liable.

Others say that Raba said: Come and hear AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING. This surely implies⁴²  that only when he acted THROUGH ERROR [namely] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING he is exonerated, but when he mistook suet for fat and ate it he is liable!⁴³  — Perhaps [it was retorted, our Mishnah implies] either THROUGH ERROR or IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING.⁴⁴

[The following are] in dispute [on the case mentioned]: If the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook suet for fat and ate it, Rab said: He is exonerated, and R. Johanan said: He is liable.

An objection was raised: Of the common people [sin] in doing⁴⁵  excludes⁴⁶  the apostate.⁴⁷  R. Simeon b. Jose said in the name of R. Simeon: This is not necessary; since it is written, [And doeth] through error [any of all the things], which [the Lord hath commanded] not to be done, and is guilty; if [his sin] … be known to him,⁴⁸  [which shows that only] he who repents when it becomes known to him [that he has sinned] brings a sacrifice for a sin he committed through error, but he who does not repent when he becomes aware [of his sin] does not bring a sacrifice for a sin he has committed through error.⁴⁹  Now, if [this view] is tenable, surely [it may be objected], he⁵⁰  would not repent even when he becomes aware [of the facts]!⁵¹  — R. Papa replied: R. Johanan holds the view that since the court would repent when [the error] became known to them, and he⁵²  also would then repent, [such a person] may justly be described as one who repents of his action when he becomes aware [of his sin], and he is, therefore, liable.

Raba said: Rab agrees that he is not counted in the making up of the majority of the congregation.⁵³  What is the reason? Scripture says, through error, implying [that no sacrifice is to be brought] unless all of them shared⁵⁴  one and the same 'error'.

WHETHER THEY ACTED [THUS] AND HE ACTED WITH THEM etc. What need was there⁵⁵  to teach all these?⁵⁶  [In the case of] the former section, this may be justified [as being a climactic arrangement]: 'not only this but also that;'⁵⁷  in the later section, however, where liability is spoken of, the order, surely, should have been reversed!⁵⁸

1. Heb. Beth din, House of Judgement or Law, v. Glos.
2. This will be explained in the Gemara Infra.
3. The members of the court.
4. In accordance with their decision.
5. Eating, e.g., together with them blood or suet.
6. From bringing the prescribed sin offerings. V. Lev. IV, 27 ff.
7. The member of the court or the disciple who knew the ruling to be erroneous.
8. To bring the prescribed sin offerings. Cf. n. 6. supra.
9. Being capable of deciding such matters for himself.
10. Lit., 'guilty', 'culpable'.
11. Lit., 'until they' would say' to them', i.e., to the public.
12. Unless the ruling was issued in this definite form it is not regarded as final. [Cf. B. B. 130b.] Hence, in the case there the entire, or the majority of the public transgressed by relying on a ruling of a court to which the formula 'You are permitted' was not added, neither they nor the court are under an obligation to bring a sin offering (v. Lev. IV, 13 ff). nor is an individual in the case of such a ruling entitled to claim exemption by reason of his reliance upon the court. (The question whether, in any case, the court or the congregation, are to bring the offering is a matter of dispute, infra).
13. If 'to act' is not added.
14. A 'rebellious elder' who defied the authority of the supreme court in Jerusalem. Deut. XVII, 8 ff.
15. Before the decision of the supreme court.
16. In accordance with his own decisions.
17. Sanh. 86b. The expression 'to act' in this case implies final decision, similar to the formula 'You are permitted to act' required by R. Dimi.
18. Lit., 'they taught her or directed her'.
19. A woman the death of whose husband is attested by one witness only. (In the case of two witnesses no special ruling of a court is necessary.)
20. Which was in any case forbidden to her.
21. Her husband having subsequently appeared.
22. I.e., to contract a lawful marriage. Yeb. 87b. Since the expression 'decided' and not merely 'allowed' is used, a definite and final decision is meant. Cf. supra note 5.
23. 'Ruled … may be transgressed', implies definite and final decision to act. Cf. previous note.
24. Lit., 'there are who say'.
25. V. supra p. I for notes.
26. V. supra p. 2 for notes. This proves, contrary to the view of H. Dimi, that the formula 'you are permitted' is not sufficient unless 'to act' is added!
27. V. supra p. for notes, and Previous note.
28. Lit., 'Why to me'.
29. 'Forbidden fat', v. Lev. III, 17. VII, 25.
30. Lit., 'it was is exchanged for him'.
31. Thus sinning through error, though not 'serially 'at their ruling', since he ate the suet not because he depended upon the court but lease he thought the suet was fat.
32. Because even if he had known it to be suet he would have eaten it, relying on the ruling of the court.
33. I.e., the case where a person ate suet not through his own error but through his reliance upon the ruling of the court.
34. V. supra note 5.
35. Since his error was not due to the Court's ruling. The Mishnah had to specify both 'through error', and 'in accordance with their ruling', to indicate that where the sin was due to his error alone be is liable.
36. V. p. 3, n. 5.
37. Is he exempt from a sin offering because the court permitted the eating of suet; or is he liable since he ate the suet not because of his reliance upon the court but through his own error of mistaking suet for fat?
38. Lit., 'why to me'.
39. [Delete with MS.M.: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, v. D.S. a.l.]
40. Lit., 'not'?
41. I.e., in accordance with the first version of Raba's statement.
42. Lit., 'what, not'
43. I.e., in accordance with the second version of Raba's statement.
44. And one is exonerated in either case Hence a person mistaking suet for fat would also be exonerated.
45. Lev. IV, 27.
46. 'Of the people', [H], the partitive implying. 'not all of them'.
47. From whom no offering is to be accepted.
48. Lev. IV, 22f
49. An apostate does not repent when he becomes aware of his sin.
50. The person who mistook suet for fat.
51. Because even when it was brought us his notice that he ate suet he would not repent, in view of the ruling of the court. How then could R. Johanan subject one in such a case to the obligation of a sacrifice?
52. The person who mistook the suet for fat.
53. The sacrifice of a bullock on the part of the congregation (Lev. IV, 13 ff) is brought only when all or at least a majority of the people had committed the same sin through the error of the court. Eating forbidden food by mistake is not the same as eating it deliberately in reliance upon the decision of a court, though erroneous (MS.M. preserves a clearer inference: Num. XV, 26, For in respect of all the people it was done in error.]
54. Lit., 'were in'.
55. Lit., 'wherefore to him'.
56. Acting with, acting after, etc.
57. Not only is one exonerated when acting together with the court (a definite case of dependence on it) but also when acting after them, not only when the court also has so acted but even when one acted alone but in reliance on the court's ruling.
58. Since each succeeding case is more obvious than the previous one as regards obligation.

Horayoth 2b

ONE OF THEM WHO KNEW THAT THEY HAD ERRED, OR A DISCIPLE WHO WAS HIMSELF CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW. What need was there for the two? — Raba replied: Both are required, since, otherwise, it might have been assumed that the reference was only to²  one who possesses learning and is also capable of logical reasoning and deduction but not to one possessing learning and no capacity for logical reasoning. Said Abaye to him: Surely, CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW implies the possession of knowledge and also capacity for logical reasoning! What I mean, the other replied, is this: If [the inference had to be derived] from that,³  it might have been assumed that the reference is only to²  one who possesses learning and is also capable of logical reasoning and deduction, but not to one possessing learning and no capacity for logical reasoning and deduction; hence it was taught, CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW [so that] from the superfluous Mishnah [it may be inferred that the reference includes] even him who possesses learning only, though incapable of logical reasoning and deduction, [as well as] him who is only capable of logical reasoning and deduction though he possesses no learning.

CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW etc. Like whom, for instance? — Raba replied: For instance, like Simeon b. Azzai and Simeon b. Zoma.⁴  Said Abaye to him: In the case of such [scholars] it would be a wilful transgression!⁵  And according to your argument, [the other replied, how will you explain] the following wherein it was taught: 'In doing one,⁶  [implies that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable; if under the authority of the ruling of the court, he is exonerated. How is this so? [In the case where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and it was known to one of then, or to a disciple sitting before them and capable of deciding matters of law, such for instance as Simeon b. 'Azzai, that they erred, it might have been assumed that he is exonerated, hence it was expressly taught, in doing one,⁷  [implying that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable: if under the authority of the ruling of the court he is exonerated'?⁸  How then could this⁹  be possible? [Obviously] in such a case as where [the scholar] knew that it¹⁰  was prohibited, but erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages;¹¹  according to my view also¹²  it is a case where they erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages.

THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE WHO IS [IN A POSITION] TO RELY UPON HIMSELF IS SUBJECT TO A PENALTY. What does this include? It includes one who usually disregards¹³  the decisions of the court.¹⁴  'HE WHO MUST DEPEND UPON THE COURT includes [the case where] the court issued a decision and when they discovered that they erred they retracted.¹⁵  But this, surely, is explicitly stated!¹⁶  — It was first stated here and later it was amplified.

Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: This¹⁷  is the view of R. Judah, but the Sages maintain that an individual who acted in accordance with [an erroneous] ruling of the court is liable.

Which [statement of] R. Judah [is referred to]? — It was taught: If any one person … sin through error in doing,¹⁸  behold there are three limitations¹⁹  [to indicate that only] he who acts on his own authority is liable; [but he who acts] on the authority of the ruling of the court is exonerated.

Which [statement of the] Rabbis?²⁰  — It was taught: Lest it be said²¹  that a minority of the congregation who committed a sin are subject to the obligation of a sacrifice because the court does not bring a bullock on their account,²²  but a majority of the congregation who had committed a sin should be exempt because the court brings a bullock on their account,²²  Scripture expressly stated, Of the common people²³  [to indicate that] even if a majority of them²⁴  or all of them. Now, in what [circumstances was the sin spoken of committed]? If it be suggested through error in action,²⁵  how [it may be asked] does the court enter at all into the question²⁶  when [the commission of the sin] was not on the authority of the ruling of the court? Does then a court bring [a sacrifice] when [the commission of the sin] was not under the authority of their ruling!²⁷  If, however, [it be suggested that the sin had been committed] under the authority of the ruling of the court, surely [it may be pointed out] the text, Of the common people,²³  was written in reference to error in action!²⁵  Consequently²⁸  [it must be concluded that] it is this that was meant: A minority of the congregation who committed a sin through error in action²⁵  are liable, because the court does not bring a bullock on their account in [the case where a sin was committed] on the authority of the ruling of the court, and yet they²⁹  are liable.³⁰  [Since, however,] one might assume that a majority of the congregation who committed [a sin] through error in action²⁵  should be exempt because the court brings a bullock on their account when [the sin was committed] under the authority of the ruling of the court, it was expressly taught, 'Of the common people'³¹  [to include] even a majority of them.³²

Said R. Papa: Whence [is this proved]? Is it not possible that neither they nor the court [bring any sacrifice]!³³  — If so,³⁴  why should it be sought to prove that a majority is liable?³⁵  Must it not then be concluded that [in the case of] a minority acting under a court's ruling it had been definitely established that they were liable, though they had acted under the authority of the ruling of a court;³⁶  for [otherwise] it should have been sought first to prove that a minority is liable, when sinning through error of action, and then should have come the attempt to prove that a majority also is liable when sinning through error of action. Consequently, since³⁷  the attempt has not been made [first] to prove that a minority is liable, when sinning through error of action, and only finally to prove that a majority [also] is liable when sinning through error of action, it must be concluded that a minority [committing a sin] under the ruling of the court are liable [to bring] a lamb or a goat, and likewise when they committed the sin under no authority from the ruling of a court, through error of action, they are also liable.³⁸

Consider, however, this: Both [Baraithas]³⁹  have been taught⁴⁰  anonymously, whence then [is it proved] that the first one [represents the view of] R. Judah and the last [that of] the Rabbis? Might not the reverse be suggested! — Who has been heard to make an exposition on limitations in such a manner?⁴¹  Surely it was R. Judah: for it has been taught: R. Judah said:

1. Lit., 'he teaches'.
2. Lit., 'these words'.
3. If one qualification only had been mentioned.
4. They were for some reason never ordained. V. Sanh. 17b.
5. Involving no sacrifice, while our Mishnah does subject such disciples to the obligation of a sacrifice.
6. Lev. IV. 27. [H] Lit., 'in her doing one', 'her' referring to 'soul', the subject of the sentence.
7. V. p. 6, n. 7.
8. Which shows that even in the case of a Ben 'Azzai he is not considered a wilful transgressor, contrary to the view of Abaye.
9. The obligation to bring a sacrifice on the part of a scholar who knew the ruling of the court to be wrong.
10. That which the court permitted.
11. Believing that the Sages must be obeyed even here they permit a thing prohibited.
12. Raba's: Instancing b. 'Azzai and b. Zoma, as the kind of disciple referred to in our Mishnah.
13. Lit., 'kicks against'.
14. It is obvious, therefore, that on this occasion he acted in accordance with their decision, not because he relied upon their ruling but because it happened to agree with his convenience or with his view.
15. Even in such a case the individual who acted on the authority of their ruling is exonerated.
16. In the Mishnah infra 3b.
17. The ruling of our Mishnah exempting an individual acting on the erroneous decision of the court.
18. Lev. IV, 27. E.V.. 'If anyone etc.'
19. 'One', 'person', 'in its doing'. [H] Cf. Shab. 93a.
20. The Sages.
21. Lit., 'I might yet say'.
22. I.e., If they committed the sin by acting in accordance with his erroneous ruling of the court.
23. Lev. IV. 27.
24. Lit., 'her', the congregation.
25. The people committed the sin through their own error and not in depending on an erroneous ruling of the court.
26. Lit., 'what is their doing?'
27. [Read with MS.M.: 'If it be … in action, not on the ruling of the court, how does the court enter etc.?]
28. Lit., 'but not'.
29. The minority of the congregation.
30. Because, according to the Rabbis, even an individual who acted under the ruling of a court is also obliged to bring the prescribed sin offering.
31. V. p. 8, n. 5.
32. I.e., that even where most of the people committed the sin, everyone of them must bring the sin offering prescribed in Lev. IV, 27ff.
33. The Baraitha cited being interpreted as follows.' A minority ate liable to bring a sacrifice when they have sinned through error in action because only in the case where their sin was committed on the authority of the court's ruling neither the court nor they themselves (acting as they did under the court's authority) are liable. Whereas in the case of a majority, since the court brings a bullock on their account, they should be exempt in respect of error in action.
34. That a minority who committed a sin under the authority of a ruling of the court is exempt from the obligation of bringing a sacrifice.
35. In respect of an error in action when the liability of a minority has not yet been proved.
36. And this warrants the assumption that they are liable in respect of error in action.
37. Lit., 'but not'.
38. [The text in cur. edd. is unduly long and not smooth. MS.M. preserves a better reading: Why should the Tanna have sought to prove that a majority is liable in respect of an error in action, he should first have sought to prove that a minority is liable in respect of error in action and then attempted to show that a majority (too) is liable through error in action. Consequently it must be concluded that a minority (committing a sin) under the ruling' etc.]
39. The one ascribed to R. Judah and the one ascribed to the Sages.
40. Lit., 'we learned'.
41. As supra 'behold these are three limitations'.